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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[I]f we can’t do ICS, we cannot manage disasters.”1 
On July 25, 2010, while much of the nation’s attention remained 
riveted on the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, another 
environmental disaster began one thousand miles north in Marshall, 
Michigan. At 5:58 p.m. local time, an oil pipeline owned and operated by 
Enbridge Inc. ruptured in a wetland near a tributary of the Kalamazoo 
River.2 For seventeen hours, the rupture went unnoticed as oil poured 
from the pipeline into the river system.3 Carried by heavy rains, the oil 
spread over thirty river miles,4 overtopping dams, injuring wildlife, 
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 1. HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109–322, at 563 (2006) 
[hereinafter A NATION STILL UNPREPARED] (citing Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s 
Operations Professionals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’tl Affairs, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Coordinating Officer, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. 
Agency)). 
 2. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT REPORT: ENBRIDGE INCORPORATED 
HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE RUPTURE AND RELEASE (2010) (adopted July 2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Enbridge Pipeline Oil Spill Near Marshall, Michigan: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency) [hereinafter Jackson Statement]; see also EPA’s Response to the Enbridge Oil Spill, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 14, 2003), http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/.  
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prompting local evacuations, and posing an ultimate threat to Lake Mich-
igan downstream.5 
The size and gravity of the Enbridge oil spill required a massive 
and immediate response, led by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). On July 27, 2010, within twenty-four hours of discover-
ing the spill, the EPA regional office issued an order under the federal 
Clean Water Act6 requiring Enbridge to provide for immediate actions to 
stop the oil discharge, contain the oil slick, and begin environmental 
cleanup.7 By the next day, July 28, 2010, hundreds of response personnel 
along with heavy equipment deployed to the scene, and Enbridge report-
ed that it had stopped the oil from flowing into the river. By that time, 
however, nearly 850,000 gallons of oil had discharged into the river, re-
quiring containment and cleanup operations that would continue for 
weeks, months, and ultimately years.8 Early operations included the use 
of “[m]ore than 200 boats,” “85 miles of absorbent boom,” and over 
2,000 response personnel.9 Among this horde descending upon Marshall, 
Michigan, were, of course, the lawyers. 
Like the legion of litigators drawn to the British Petroleum (BP) oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the same year, agency attorneys and corpo-
rate counsel leaped into action to address liability concerns flowing from 
the Enbridge oil spill in Michigan. The government would seek to recov-
er its own response costs,10 and injured parties would seek compensation 
for a variety of losses.11 There might be civil fines,12 criminal penalties,13 
                                                 
 5. EPA’s Response to the Enbridge Oil Spill in Michigan (Environmental Response Television 
2011) [hereinafter Enbridge Response] (on file with author). As the first EPA responder to arrive 
later described the scene, “I expected to see oil when I got here, and I did. And actually, there was no 
water in the creek. When I showed up, it was oil. It was straight, black, crude oil. And it was roiling, 
like in a whitewater river, but in a creek.” Id. (statement of Jeff Kimble, EPA On-Scene Coordina-
tor). 
 6. Clean Water Act § 311(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (2011). Pursuant to Section 311(c) of the 
Clean Water Act, EPA may “direct or monitor all Federal, State, and private actions to remove a 
discharge” “of oil or a hazardous substance . . . into or on the navigable waters [or] on the adjoining 
shorelines to the navigable waters” of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(c)(1)(A)–(A)(ii), 
(B)(ii). 
 7. See In the Matter of Enbridge Energy, LP, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Docket No. CWA 1321-5-
10-001 (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/enbridgespill/ar/enbridge-AR-
1720.pdf. 
 8. In June 2012, after two full years of cleanup operations, federal, state, and local agencies 
announced the reopening of thirty-four miles of the Kalamazoo River to recreational use. Certain 
areas still remain closed to the public, however, and oil recovery operations continue as of this writ-
ing. See EPA Orders Enbridge to Perform Additional Dredging to Remove Oil from Kalamazoo 
River, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/region5/enbridge 
spill/index.html. 
 9. Enbridge Response, supra note 5. 
 10. See Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2010). 
 11. As of March 31, 2012, the Enbridge spill had reportedly cost the company $765 million. At 
the same time, some twenty-five lawsuits had been filed against the company in federal and state 
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or natural resource damages.14 Insurance claims would be filed, defenses 
would be invoked, and efforts would be made to share burdens all 
around. 
These may be familiar roles for lawyers, drawing from established 
practice areas such as environmental law, torts, and insurance.15 Howev-
er, in the emerging field of disaster law,16 lawyers from almost any disci-
pline may find roles in what the literature of disaster law conceptualizes 
as a “disaster cycle,” including preparedness, response, recovery, and 
mitigation.17 Within this cycle, conventional thinking confines lawyers to 
the recovery phase, in particular, pursuing claims or litigation seeking 
compensation from government agencies, insurance companies, or re-
sponsible parties. This association certainly has reason, as attested by the 
epic legal responses to 9/11,18 Hurricane Katrina,19 and the Deepwater 
                                                                                                             
courts. Matt Pearce, NTSB Report Enbridge’s Response to Michigan Oil Spill Was “Poor,” L.A. 
TIMES, July 10, 2012. 
 12. Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7) (2010). 
 13. Id. § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (defining federal crimes and respective penalties includ-
ing criminal fines and imprisonment). 
 14. See Oil Pollution Act §§ 1002(b)(2)(A), 1006, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2)(A), 2706 (2010). 
 15. Recognizing the close connection between disaster law and more established areas of prac-
tice, the American Bar Association (ABA) and its various committees have sponsored a number of 
recent initiatives to promote the study and practice of disaster law. For example, the ABA has estab-
lished a Special Committee on Disaster Response and Preparedness, which maintains a broad collec-
tion of disaster-related legal resources. See Committee on Disaster Response and Preparedness, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/disaster.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2012). 
 16. The first legal textbook in this emerging field was published in 2006, the year following 
Hurricane Katrina, and is now in its second edition. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND 
POLICY (2d ed. 2010); see also Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection 
of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1786–93 (arguing for disaster 
law as an emerging field of legal study, comparable to the field of environmental law in the 1960s 
and 70s). 
 17. Professor Nicholson describes these elements succinctly as follows: “(1) mitigation, the 
lessening or avoidance of a hazard; (2) preparedness, including planning, training, and exercising; 
(3) response, referring to actions taken in the immediate aftermath of an event to deal with its ef-
fects; and (4) recovery, bringing circumstances back to at least the status they had prior to the emer-
gency event.” William C. Nicholson, Obtaining Competent Legal Advice: Challenges for Emergency 
Managers and Attorneys, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 343, 346 (2010); see also Daniel A. Farber, Introduc-
tion: Legal Scholarship, the Disaster Cycle, and the Fukushima Accident, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 1 (2012) (illustrating the disaster cycle in context of Fukushima meltdown in Japan). 
 18. For an extraordinary film documentary examining compensation questions following 9/11, 
see OUT OF THE ASHES: 9/11 (Marilyn Berger, Exec. Producer, 2011) (discussing families of 9/11 
victims and the role of lawyers respecting claims against the Victim Compensation Fund, created by 
Congress eleven days after terrorist strikes). 
 19. See, e.g., Eugene Benick, The Flood After the Storm: The Hurricane Katrina Homeowners’ 
Insurance Litigation, 4 BUS. L. BRIEF 49 (2007); David M. Stein, Flood of Litigation: Theories of 
Liability of Government Entities for Damages Resulting from Levee Breaches, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1335 
(2006) (discussing early phases of In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation); Symposi-
um, The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2423 (2008). 
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Horizon.20 Less obvious, however, from the Enbridge response and other 
recent cases, were the contributions that lawyers and legal scholars could 
make at other points within the disaster cycle, including the response 
phase.21 For lawyers, these roles include legal advisors and agency liai-
sons, operating within a management framework known as the Incident 
Command System (ICS). 
ICS is a “management system designed to enable effective, efficient 
incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equip-
ment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a 
common organizational structure.”22 Through the use of standardized 
positions (e.g., incident commander), common terminology (e.g., inci-
dent command post), and consistent management philosophies (e.g., uni-
ty of command), ICS seeks to facilitate the rapid integration of personnel 
from different agencies and entities into one organization to meet a 
common objective.23 
Developed in California in the early 1970s,24 the Incident Com-
mand System is used today throughout the United States by federal, 
state, tribal, and local governments, as well as nongovernmental organi-
zations and the private sector, to plan for and respond to incidents of all 
kinds that require coordination among agencies and organizations.25 ICS 
applies to “all hazards,” including natural disasters (e.g., tornadoes, 
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods) and manmade incidents (e.g., terrorist 
                                                 
 20. See, e.g., John Wyeth Griggs, BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, 32 ENERGY L.J. 57, 58 n.2 
(2011) (noting over 400 lawsuits were filed within the year following the blowout of the BP oil 
well). The lawsuits were in addition to claims presented directly to the BP Gulf Coast Compensation 
Facility, which transitioned on June 4, 2012, to the Court Supervised Settlement Program. For com-
plete information, see DEEPWATER HORIZON COURT-SUPERVISED SETTLEMENT PROGRAM, 
www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com (last updated Jan. 11, 2013). 
 21. As Professor Farber recently observed, “although at first sight emergency response might 
seem like an area beyond the control of the legal system, legal scholarship has a clear capacity to 
help guide reforms.” Farber, supra note 17, at 15. 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 45 (2008) 
[hereinafter NIMS DOCUMENT], available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/ 
NIMS_core.pdf. 
 23. Id. In the Enbridge spill in Michigan, for example, response personnel came from agencies 
and organizations including the U.S. EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, the U.S. 
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration, the Michigan Department of Natural Re-
sources and the Environment, the Michigan State Police, the Kalamazoo County Sheriff, the Cal-
houn County Public Health Department, the City of Battle Creek, Enbridge itself, plus contractors 
for the agencies and private parties. Jackson Statement, supra note 4; Enbridge Response, supra note 
5. 
 24. See ERIK AUF DER HEIDE, DISASTER RESPONSE: PRINCIPLES OF PREPARATION AND 
COORDINATION 135 (1989). 
 25. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 89. 
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strikes, oil spills).26 Fire departments use ICS to put out fires,27 local law 
enforcement agencies use ICS to respond to traffic accidents and civil 
disorder, 28 and public health officials use ICS to respond to public health 
emergencies.29 Court staff, school principals, and campus security use 
ICS to ensure the security of courthouses,30 school grounds,31 and college 
campuses.32 ICS can be used for planning events of all size, from local 
sporting matches33 to Olympic Games.34 It appears now that ICS is be-
ginning to be adopted internationally.35 
While ICS has existed for some forty years, the use of ICS grew 
significantly in the past decade because the United States learned hard 
lessons from infamous failures of incident management after 9/11 and 
                                                 
 26. ROBERT RADVANOVSKY, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 100 (2006) (noting applications of ICS). 
 27. FIREFIGHTING RES. OF CAL. ORGANIZED FOR POTENTIAL EMERGENCIES, INCIDENT 
COMMAND SYSTEM FOR FIRE DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE FIRE OPERATIONS (ICS-SF) (1994). 
 28. See CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE FOR EMERGENCY 
OPERATIONS 18 (2009); see also GEORGE BUCK, PREPARING FOR TERRORISM: AN EMERGENCY 
SERVICES GUIDE 233–67 (1997) (describing response of the Los Angeles Police Department and 
other agencies to riots following the Rodney King verdict in 1992). 
 29. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of Law in Public Health Preparedness: Oppor-
tunities and Challenges, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 297, 312 (2012) (concluding that “there are 
serious deficiencies in legal preparedness that can undermine effective responses to public health 
emergencies”). 
 30. Interview with Melissa Muir, Dir. Admin. Servs., U.S. Dist. Court, W. Dist. of Wash. (Feb. 
1, 2012) (explaining federal judges and court staff receive training in ICS). 
 31. See, e.g., SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY NO. 3432, at 1 (2011) (requiring “building 
principal to be certified on the incident command system”), available at 
http://www.seattleschools.org/modules/groups/homepagefiles/cms/1583136/File/Policies/Board/seri
es3000/3432.pdf?sessionid=64795a4714bd9e2f77914afba79f915b. 
 32. See Oren R. Griffin, Constructing a Legal and Managerial Paradigm Applicable to the 
Modern-Day Safety and Security Challenge at Colleges and Universities, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 241, 
246 (2009) (noting that in response to campus shootings and other safety incidents, the “higher edu-
cation community should give careful consideration to the methods and management approaches, 
such as ICS, that attempt to improve coordination and effectiveness”). 
 33. Michael D. Cardwell & Patrick T. Cooney, Nationwide Application of the Incident Com-
mand System, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 2000, at 10, 14, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2000-pdfs/oct00leb.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., LYNNE GENIK & DAVID G. SMITH, COMMAND AND CONTROL ANALYSIS OF THE 
SOUTH WEST PROVINCIAL REGIONAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE DURING VANCOUVER 
2010 (2011), available at http://www.dodccrp.org/events/16th_iccrts_2011/presentations/049.pdf 
(describing use of ICS in planning and execution of 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, British 
Columbia). 
 35. For example, the United States has helped train Brazilian security forces on ICS in prepara-
tion for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. See U.S. Sponsors Security Training with Rio 
de Janeiro Security Forces, DEP’T OF STATE, http://brazil.usembassy.gov/securityforcesrj.html (last 
visited June 9, 2013). FEMA has also provided ICS training internationally, including in Germany in 
fiscal year 2012 and Japan in 2013. See FEMA Emergency Management Institute, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY, http://training.fema.gov/EMI/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
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Hurricane Katrina.36 Use of ICS may also be growing simply because we 
have more frequent and catastrophic incidents, brought upon us by 
chronic problems including aging infrastructure,37 risky business en-
deavors,38 and climate change.39 Indeed, in the wake of more recent cli-
mate-related events including Hurricane Irene in 2011 and Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012,40 policymakers and legal scholars41 may look increasing-
ly to ICS as one tool for climate change adaptation.42 As such, ICS theo-
ry and practice must be understood by legal scholars and practitioners 
who seek to contribute to the growing fields of climate change adaptation 
and disaster response. 
                                                 
 36. See, e.g., Eric Mayes, Local Disaster Preparedness Plan Evolving, About Response, PHILA. 
TRIB. (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.phillytrib.com/newsarticles/item/468-local-disaster-preparedness-
plan-evolving-about-response.html (describing ICS as “[p]erhaps the most important change” in 
emergency management since 9/11). 
 37. See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 16, at 64–68 (describing need to repair levees and 
dams throughout the United States); Bobby Magill, How Much Life Is Left in the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line?, POPULAR MECHS., Feb. 2012 (recognizing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline is thirty-five years old 
and in need of investment to extend useful life). 
 38. Professor Oliver Houck describes the Deepwater Horizon disaster as a demonstration of 
“risk creep,” where on-shore oil drilling more than a century ago moved into wetlands, then open 
water, then finally water a mile deep. Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon 
Blowout: There Ought to Be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11033, 11034 (2010). 
 39. For more than twenty years, the predicted effects of climate change have included disasters 
such as stronger and more frequent hurricanes. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 95–
96 (1989). Over time, these predicted effects, which also include more intense and frequent fires, 
floods, droughts, storms and tornadoes, have become increasingly sophisticated and certain. See 
CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 22 (2009). 
Recent U.S. history appears to have validated these predictions, with record floods, fires, hurricanes, 
and heat waves in 2011 and 2012. See sources cited infra notes 277–89 and accompanying text. 
 40. Of course, one cannot say with certainty that recent hurricanes including Irene and Sandy 
were caused directly by climate change. However, the hurricanes were likely strengthened by cli-
mate change, through such effects as the rise in sea level and warmer waters in the Atlantic. See 
Jeffrey Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a 
Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Resources, 42 ENVTL. L. 1101, 1115 n.63 
(2012). 
 41. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Domestic Disaster Preparedness and Response, in THE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 481 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) 
(observing that “the issue of disaster preparedness and response has much to do with climate change 
adaptation”). 
 42. According to the EPA, climate “adaptation” refers to “efforts by society or ecosystems to 
prepare for or adjust to future climate change.” See Adaptation Overview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/adapt-overview.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013). Consistent with the predictions for climate change impacts, organizations including the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change and agencies including the EPA have emphasized the need 
for climate change adaptation plans to help prepare for the anticipated impacts of climate change. 
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLAN ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (2007). 
One “guiding principle” for the development of such plans, according to the EPA, is to “use strate-
gies that complement or directly support other related climate or environmental initiatives, such as 
efforts to improve disaster preparedness.” ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
PLAN 33 (2012). One such effort to improve disaster preparedness is expanded training on ICS. 
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Filling a gap in the legal literature, Part II will provide lawyers and 
legal scholars with an introduction to the Incident Command System, 
outlining the origin, doctrines, and organizational framework of ICS, 
along with major early critiques. Part III illustrates the law and applica-
tion of ICS through transformative events including 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon. Part IV examines the potential roles 
for lawyers in ICS, including the emerging ICS position of legal officer. 
Part V concludes with suggestions for future legal research and practice 
in the Incident Command System. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
Although some forty years old, the Incident Command System 
seems to have largely escaped the critical attention of the legal communi-
ty.43 This may be changing, however, because legal scholars44 and practi-
tioners45 are coming to recognize the new reality brought to us by aging 
infrastructure, risky endeavors, and climate change, a reality summed up 
                                                 
 43. One notable exception is Professor William Nicholson, who has been writing about the 
Incident Command System from the perspective of emergency management and homeland security 
for over a decade. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 17; William C. Nicholson, Legal Issues in Emer-
gency Response to Terrorism Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials: The Hazardous Waste Op-
erations and Emergency Response (“HAZWOPER”) Standard, Standard Operating Procedures, 
Mutual Aid and the Incident Management System, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 295 (2003) [hereinafter 
Nicholson, Legal Issues in Emergency Response]; William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on 
Homeland Security Standards: Adopting the National Response Plan and the National Incident 
Management System, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 491 (2006) [hereinafter Nicholson, Seeking Consensus]. 
 44. Among the legal scholarship, a number of scholars have acknowledged the Incident Com-
mand System. See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 16, at 136–45 (discussing ICS in context of the 
National Incident Management System); Denis Binder, Lessons from the BP Emergency Action Plan 
in Action, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11115, 11116 (2011) (discussing critical elements of an emergency 
action plan, including provisions for a “unified incident command and incident commander”); Lance 
Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through Integrated Pluralistic 
Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 410 (2012) (identifying ICS as the “backbone” of most current 
public health response plans, consistent with traditional governance models); Gregg P. Macey, Envi-
ronmental Crisis and the Paradox of Planning, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2063. Professor Macey’s article 
probably goes furthest in acknowledging the existence and need for organizing systems such as the 
Incident Command System, recognizing that “what stands between us and the scale and scope of 
future environmental crises are organizations.” Macey, supra, at 2066. After examining the roots of 
organizational challenges and failures in the context of the Deepwater Horizon response, Macey 
concludes that the “struggle to differentiate tasks and subunits and then piece them together during 
moments of great uncertainty . . . should receive greater attention.” Id. at 2111. 
 45. Practitioners have also recognized ICS in recent work. See, e.g., OTTO J. HETZEL & 
ERNEST B. ABBOTT, HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 252–53 (2d ed. 2010) (“ICS permits the authority having juris-
diction over the incident to retain command and control, while accessing the resources of local, state, 
and federal agencies through mutual aid and other mechanisms.”); Joseph V. Panesko, Are You 
Prepared? Lawyers’ Roles in Preparing for and Responding to Disasters, WASH. ST. BAR ASS’N 
BAR NEWS, Jan. 2008, at 16 (“[A]ll levels of government emergency responders, whether local, 
state, or federal, are required to implement the ICS template into their operational structures . . . .”). 
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succinctly by Professor Farber: “Disasters, both natural and human-
induced, are an increasingly common feature of twenty-first century 
life.”46 This reality gives rise to a “dire need for a systematic, thoughtful 
approach to managing the chaos of disasters.”47 One such “systematic, 
thoughtful approach” may be the Incident Command System. Under-
standing ICS today may require some knowledge of how it developed. 
This Part thus begins by discussing the origin of ICS. For the conven-
ience of readers new to the Incident Command System, this Part then 
outlines the basic structure and tenets of ICS, along with some critical 
evaluations of ICS theory. 
A. Origins 
The Incident Command System arose in response to a series of 
devastating wildland fires in southern California in the fall of 1970. 
Within thirteen days, the fires consumed sixteen lives, 700 structures, 
and over one-half million acres, with costs and losses totaling $18 mil-
lion per day.48 While the various fire agencies did their best to contain 
the conflagrations, differences in personnel, equipment, terminology, and 
organizational structures hampered the effectiveness of their response 
efforts.49 In 1972, Congress tried to help address those problems by 
providing funds to the U.S. Forest Service for research on methods to 
“strengthen fire command and control systems.”50 That research, drawing 
upon Forest Service collaborations with local fire agencies in southern 
California, resulted in a system that came to be known as FIRESCOPE 
(Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergen-
cies).51 
In 1973, a FIRESCOPE technical team assembled to guide devel-
opment of a command structure that would facilitate multi-agency coor-
                                                 
 46. Farber, supra note 17, at 20. 
 47. Id. 
 48. RADVANOVSKY, supra note 26, at 97. 
 49. One account described the California wildfires of 1970 as a scene of “total chaos that en-
veloped the dozens of emergency services agencies that responded to these fast moving, erratic 
wildfires.” Fire engines from the northern part of the state were sent south, passing engines on Inter-
state 5 from the south moving north, each deployed to fires hundreds of miles from their respective 
bases. DANA COLE, THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM: A 25-YEAR EVALUATION BY CALIFORNIA 
PRACTITIONERS 209 (2000). 
 50. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 92-369 
(1972); see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & RELATED 
AGENCIES, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. at 1734 (Mar. 7, 1972) (appropriating $900,000 for research at River-
side, California, and Fort Collins, Colorado). 
 51. See sources cited supra note 50. For a detailed history of FIRESCOPE and its continuing 
role in California fire and emergency response, see FIRESCOPE, www.firescope.org (last visited Apr. 
20, 2013). 
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dination in responding to emergency incidents.52 In developing this 
command structure, technical team members drew organizational ideas 
from contemporary research on systems theory53 and operational struc-
tures from existing models for fire response.54 Reflecting growing inter-
est in a command structure that could apply to all types of emergencies, 
the focus expanded beyond firefighting, and the “Incident Command 
System” was born.55 
By the mid-1970s, the FIRESCOPE agencies had agreed upon the 
major features and terminology of the Incident Command System and, 
by 1980, had successfully tested ICS on several major wildland fires. 
ICS was soon being used widely on fires throughout southern California, 
and it was then considered for use nationally on a much broader array of 
emergencies, including floods, earthquakes, airplane crashes, and haz-
ardous materials incidents.56 In 1994, ICS received one of its first tests in 
a major disaster when applied in response to the Northridge Earthquake 
in Los Angeles.57 Over time, the experiences of different organizations 
implementing ICS in different settings led to the development of differ-
                                                 
 52. RADVANOVSKY, supra note 26, at 97. 
 53. COLE, supra note 49, at 209. Systems theorists “see common principles in the structure and 
operation” of systems and seek to improve systems through doctrines including the use of a common 
language to enable interdisciplinary collaborations. LARS SKYTTNER, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: 
AN INTRODUCTION 275 (1996). Systems theory enjoyed particular popularity in the early 1970s. See, 
e.g., ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 101–02 (1974) (ex-
ploring philosophical meditation on systems including governments, churches, and motorcycles). In 
1972, establishing the research program that would lead to the creation of the Incident Command 
System, Congress appeared to have systems theory distinctly in mind when it provided funding for 
“systems research” at Riverside, California. See COLE, supra note 49. Reconnecting ICS to systems 
theory thirty years later, Cole observes that the “Incident Command System may well be considered 
one of the longest-running experiments in applied systems thinking.” Id. at 211. 
 54. Telephone Interview with Chuck Mills, Emergency Mgmt. Sys., Inc. (Apr. 22, 2012) [here-
inafter Mills Interview]. Mr. Mills served as a member of the FIRESCOPE technical team that de-
veloped ICS, and as of this writing, remains actively engaged in ICS training and assistance as a 
private consultant. Models for operational structure drew from existing fire response systems includ-
ing the Fireground Command System developed by the Phoenix Fire Department. Id. For more on 
the Fireground Command System, see ALAN V. BRUNACINI, FIRE COMMAND (1985). 
 55. Mills Interview, supra note 54. 
 56. RADVANOVSKY, supra note 26, at 98. 
 57. Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor & Benigno E. Aguirre, A Critical Evaluation of the Inci-
dent Command System and NIMS, 3 J. HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 2 (2006). 
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ent versions of ICS,58 leading to some initial confusion over which “ICS” 
model an individual organization should follow.59 
B. ICS Overview 
Today, while many versions of ICS exist, there is one national 
standard for ICS, incorporated within the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS)60 and published by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. Individual agencies may publish their own ICS guides,61 but 
they must be “NIMS-compliant.”62 Private organizations or authors may 
also publish their own ICS guides.63 For a wealth of information and ma-
terials on ICS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
maintains an online ICS Resource Center.64 For the convenience of legal 
scholars and practitioners, this section provides an overview of the basic 
doctrines and structures of the Incident Command System as described in 
the National Incident Management System.65 
                                                 
 58. Different versions of ICS include “Hospital ICS,” see CAL. EMERGENCY MED. SERVS. 
AUTH., HOSPITAL INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM GUIDEBOOK (2006), and “Law Enforcement ICS,” 
see CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
(2009). For additional information, see WALTER G. GREEN III, COMMAND AND CONTROL OF 
DISASTER OPERATIONS 9 (2001) (noting different ICS versions developed by organizations includ-
ing the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the National Fire Academy, and the American Socie-
ty for Testing and Materials). 
 59. See GLENN E. BRAUTASET, INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR 
SKAGIT COUNTY 9 (1994), available at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo37796.pdf (noting 
confusion between FIRESCOPE ICS and NIIMS ICS). 
 60. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 89. 
 61. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INCIDENT MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK: INCIDENT 
COMMAND SYSTEM (2007) [hereinafter EPA ICS HANDBOOK]. 
 62. In an evident attempt to address common confusion on this point, FEMA published on its 
website the following Frequently Asked Question: 
Q: In order to meet NIMS compliance, does it matter which brand of ICS is used. . . ? 
A: To be NIMS compliant, you need to use the Incident Command System (ICS) struc-
ture described in the current version of NIMS. 
Incident Command System, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/emergency/ 
nims/IncidentCommandSystem.shtm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (emphasis omitted). 
 63. See, e.g., TIM DEAL, CHUCK MILLS & MIKE DEAL, ALL HAZARD FIELD GUIDE: A 
RESPONDER’S HANDBOOK USING THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM’S INCIDENT 
COMMAND SYSTEM (2011). 
 64. See ICS Resource Center, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
 65. Note that the brief outline of ICS provided for convenience in this Part should not be re-
garded as a substitute for proper training in ICS as may be required for compliance with NIMS. For 
information on NIMS-compliant ICS training opportunities, see Welcome to the National Prepared-
ness Directorate  National Training and Education, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
www.training.fema.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
2013] Law and Lawyers in the Incident Command System 1865 
1. Organizational Structure 
The basic organizational structure of the Incident Command System 
appears below in Figure 1. ICS terminology and organizational principles 
draw from classical theory in military operations66 and business man-
agement.67 Consistent with military doctrine,68 ICS is intended to be flex-
ible and scalable,69 so that the size and complexity of a particular ICS 
organization will depend upon the size and complexity of a particular 
incident.70 Where multiple individuals are required to support an ICS 
function, ICS doctrine requires maintaining an appropriate “span of con-
trol”71 to ensure effective command throughout the ICS organization. 
This scenario may require adding deputies, or expanding an organization 
to include additional organizational levels or units,72 each with their own 
designated supervisors. To ensure clarity in the chain of command, the 
ICS principle of “unity of command” requires that each individual within 
an ICS organization report to one, and only one, supervisor.73 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 66. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (general staff system). 
 67. Buck, supra note 57, at 1. 
 68. Cf. HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, COMMANDER AND STAFF OFFICER GUIDE 2–3 
(2011) [hereinafter COMMANDER AND STAFF OFFICER GUIDE] (“The mission determines which 
activities to accomplish. These activities determine how commanders organize, tailor, or adapt their 
individual staffs to accomplish the mission. The mission also determines the size and composition of 
a staff to include staff augmentation.”). 
 69. See NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 6. 
 70. BUCK, supra note 28. For example, if a certain incident does not require a public infor-
mation officer, the ICS structure for that incident will not include one. If, on the other hand, a major 
incident requires significant production and dissemination of public information, then the public 
information officer (PIO) may be assisted by a Deputy PIO and a team of assistants. 
 71. Under NIMS, an appropriate span of control between supervisors and individuals is defined 
as a ratio between 1:3 and 1:7, with 1:5 being optimal. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 47, 147. 
Of course, span of control, along with many other elements of ICS, was not invented for purposes of 
ICS, but borrowed from other sources including business management. See, e.g., NAT’L INDUS. 
CONFERENCE BD., THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND HIS JOB: STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY, no. 214, at 
15 (1968) (noting studies of span of control in U.S. and foreign companies, finding that roughly half 
the companies had between four and seven direct reports to the CEO). 
 72. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 91. Radvanovsky observed in his 2006 textbook, “One 
of the greatest strengths of ICS is the ability to expand or contract the organization as needed to fit 
the activity level at the incident. Deputies may be added as needed to maintain span of control, sec-
tions may be subdivided, and the organization can grow to include other agencies and jurisdictions 
as needed.” RADVANOVSKY, supra note 26, at 110. 
 73. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 149. Of course, this principle considerably predates 
development of the Incident Command System. Cf. Matthew 6:24 (“No one can serve two mas-
ters.”). 
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Figure 1: ICS Structure 
2. Organizational Components 
 a. Incident Command 
The ICS structure builds from the top down, beginning with the in-
cident commander.74 As an ICS organization expands or contracts, the 
incident commander maintains overall responsibility for managing the 
incident. Where a single incident may involve the jurisdiction and re-
sponsibilities of two or more agencies or organizations, two or more in-
cident commanders may be designated to work together as “unified 
command.” Together, unified command supports the ICS principle of 
“management by objectives”75 by establishing a common set of objec-
tives and strategies.76 At the same time, each organization maintains its 
authority, responsibility, and accountability.77 Where one large incident 
or multiple related incidents require establishing multiple ICS structures, 
an “area command” may be established to facilitate overall incident co-
ordination without engaging in direct operational support.78 
 b. Command Staff 
The ICS command staff typically includes a safety officer, liaison 
officer, and public information officer, who report directly to the incident 
commander or unified command.79 Command staff may also include oth-
er officers, as needed for an individual incident.80 The safety officer 
                                                 
 74. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 91. 
 75. See id. at 47. 
 76. See generally id. at 49, 149 (defining “Unified Command”). 
 77. See id. at 50. 
 78. Id. at 115–17, 135 (defining “Area Command”). 
 79. Id. at 92, 137. 
 80. Additional command staff may include a medical officer or a legal officer. See id. at 95; 
see also sources cited infra notes 355–95 and accompanying text (discussing the legal officer). In 
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monitors all ICS operations and advises incident commanders on all mat-
ters related to health and safety of responders. The safety officer also has 
authority to stop or prevent unsafe actions during incident operations.81 
The liaison officer facilitates coordination with all agencies, nongovern-
mental organizations, and private sector parties that have some interest in 
the incident without having legal authority over the incident. These as-
sisting or cooperating organizations may appoint representatives to the 
liaison officer to ensure effective coordination.82 The public information 
officer is responsible for communicating with the public, news media, 
and other agencies to provide timely and accurate information about the 
incident. For large incidents, the public information officer and assistants 
may establish a “joint information center” for ease of disseminating in-
formation.83 
 c. General Staff 
Consistent with classical military organization,84 the ICS general 
staff includes the section chiefs for operations, planning, logistics, and 
finance and administration, plus other major ICS functions, as needed.85 
The operations section is responsible for developing tactics and carrying 
out actions in order to achieve the incident objectives.86 The planning 
section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating opera-
tional information.87 The planning section also prepares an incident ac-
tion plan to guide the response and continues to update it as necessary 
                                                                                                             
military doctrine, the legal officer is a required component of the command staff. Military doctrine 
also requires appointment of an inspector general and a chaplain, see COMMANDER AND STAFF 
OFFICER GUIDE, supra note 68, at 2–3, positions that have yet to be prescribed for an ICS organiza-
tion. 
 81. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 52. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Military historians report that the general staff system employed by the military today dates 
back more than two centuries, to around 1809 when it was invented by the Prussian army after its 
defeat by Napoleon. This system was later adopted by the U.S. military in 1903. The system orga-
nized needs by functional areas including plans, operations, logistics, administration, and intelli-
gence, ROBERT GREENHALGH ALBION, INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY HISTORY 140–41 (1929), 
which almost precisely reflects the functional structure of the modern Incident Command System. 
For the modern military equivalent, see, for example, COMMAND AND STAFF OFFICER GUIDE, supra 
note 68, at 2–5 (noting the “coordinating staff” supporting functions include plans, operations, logis-
tics, and intelligence). 
 85. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 54. One optional functional area explicitly identified 
by ICS is intelligence and investigations. Id. at 91. 
 86. See generally id. at 97 (Tab 2 – The Operations Section). 
 87. Id. at 105. To carry out these responsibilities, the planning section may be assisted by any 
number of technical specialists, including experts in meteorology, epidemiology, law, cultural re-
sources, and hazardous materials. 
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throughout the incident.88 The logistics section provides and manages all 
support needed for an incident response. This includes ordering and 
tracking all necessary personnel and equipment and ensuring food, fuel, 
medical services, and facilities needed to support response personnel.89 
ICS facilities supported by logistics typically include an incident com-
mand post for the incident commander or unified command and base 
camps for housing personnel.90 The finance and administration section 
manages funding, monitors expenditures, and ensures compliance with 
procedures for procurement, compensation, and claims related to the in-
cident response.91 
C. Critiques of the Incident Command System 
Given the decades of experience with implementing the Incident 
Command System across the country, social scientists and emergency 
responders naturally have undertaken critical evaluations of ICS. One 
consistent observation throughout these studies is that practitioners al-
most invariably express support for the Incident Command System.92 
This broad, consistent support for ICS among practitioners may result 
from factors with varying rationales. One suspect factor may be the phe-
nomenon that social psychologists describe as system justification theo-
ry, which observes a general human tendency to support and defend a 
social status quo, regardless of whether this support is warranted by a 
rational consideration of the evidence.93 One more meritorious factor 
                                                 
 88. Typically, the incident action plan will be updated continuously throughout the response 
for each operational period, generally twelve or twenty-four hours. In this way, the IAP can contin-
ually reflect changing conditions, new objectives, and lessons learned. RADVANOVSKY, supra note 
26, at 108. 
 89. See generally NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 107 (Tab 4 – The Logistics Section). 
 90. For more on ICP facilities, see id. at 119 (Tab 7 – Facilities and Locations). 
 91. See generally id. at 113 (Tab 5 – The Finance / Administration Section). Because of these 
administrative functions, the finance section may be situated at the incident scene or may operate 
remotely wherever an organization’s finance and administration units would normally function. 
 92. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 57, at 3 (“The response community has been almost universal in 
its praise of ICS,” citing several studies between 1986 and 2001); COLE, supra note 49, at 207 
(“[T]he consensus among long-time practitioners seems to be that ‘ICS works.’”). This is not, of 
course, to claim there is no grumbling about ICS among incident commanders and first responders. 
See, e.g., Cynthia Renaud, The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to 
Function at the Edge of Chaos, HOMELAND SEC. AFF., June 2012, at 3, available at 
http://www.hsaj.org/?article=8.1.8&fromemail=2 (noting that “many in the first-responder commu-
nity complain that NIMS doesn’t work” because ICS bureaucracy cannot adequately prepare re-
sponders for initial engagement in chaotic environments). 
 93. For an introduction to system justification theory in the context of law and lawyering, see 
Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal 
Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119 (2006). For a powerful illustration of system 
justification in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, where hurricane victims were widely blamed for their 
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may be the substantial investment that many practitioners have in ICS, 
accumulated through years of training and deployments, contributing to 
their readiness to respond to the next disaster. Yet another factor contrib-
uting to widespread support for ICS among practitioners may simply be 
the lack of any serious alternative to ICS within the last forty years. 
 Supporters of ICS may submit that ICS has stood the test of time 
and has withstood the scrutiny of numerous critical studies. Early cri-
tiques of ICS appeared to mistake failures of ICS implementation for 
defects in ICS design.94 Failures reflecting human error will always chal-
lenge any social organization, of course, but such failures also suggest 
relatively modest remedies such as training and experience, rather than 
invention and deployment of whole new systems. Other critical evalua-
tions of ICS, however, deserve closer consideration to discern both the 
appropriate uses of ICS and perhaps its limitations. Three leading studies 
on ICS will be considered in turn below. 
1. Cole (2000) 
 In 2000, Dana Cole of the California Department of Forestry and 
Fire Protection published the results of a study evaluating twenty-five 
years of practice with ICS in California.95 In view of this quarter century 
of experience, Cole begins with the overall conclusion that “[w]hile not 
perfect, ICS is a proven structure for making people productive in work-
ing together to accomplish critical tasks during times of crisis.”96 How-
ever, reviewing the literature on ICS to that point, Cole noted a number 
of common criticisms of ICS. While ICS evidently worked well for fire 
incidents, Cole noted suggestions that it failed to accommodate non-fire 
entities into the ICS structure, in particular failing to integrate law en-
forcement and volunteers. Cole also noted concerns regarding the “con-
siderable differences in how [ICS] is implemented from one agency to 
another.” Cole further acknowledged concerns with “mobilization over-
                                                                                                             
own suffering, see Jaime L. Napier et al., System Justification in Responding to the Poor and Dis-
placed in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 6 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 57 (2006). 
 94. Early critics suggested, for example, that ICS was weak in promoting interagency coordi-
nation, allowing for separate command posts for fire and law enforcement organizations. Buck, 
supra note 57, at 4. Separate command posts could, in fact, severely hinder interagency coordina-
tion, as seen with the 9/11 response at the World Trade Centers. However, practitioners pointed out 
that ICS was explicitly designed to promote interagency coordination, and that features such as 
separate command posts for different agencies conflicted with ICS concepts such as unified com-
mand and practices recommended for achieving unified command. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 58, 
at 10 (“The most successful approach to unified command under these conditions appears to include 
. . . one Command Post.”). 
 95. COLE, supra note 49. 
 96. Id. at 233. 
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kill,” an idea that ICS may lead to “serious problems of convergence and 
congestion at the disaster site.”97 
To evaluate these and other criticisms, Cole conducted a statistical 
survey of experienced practitioners of ICS within the California fire ser-
vices.98 Asked to evaluate the relative strength or weakness of ICS ac-
cording to sixteen attributes,99 respondents statistically identified no 
weaknesses among the sixteen listed attributes, and they had a strong 
tendency toward unanimity among the highest rated attributes. Not sur-
prisingly, the ICS attributes with the highest mean ratings, including 
“Predefined hierarchy,” “Uniform terminology,” “Incident Action Plan,” 
and “Span-of-Control,” reflect some of the most fundamental features of 
ICS and align with internal applications of ICS within a given response 
community.100 The Cole study also found that the lowest rated attributes 
of ICS, including “Resource mobilization,” “Effectiveness of integrating 
non-government organizations,” and “Consistency of implementation 
among various agencies,” reflected external applications where ICS 
comprehension and social relationships among responders may be most 
likely lacking. 
From this statistical evaluation, Cole posits “the single biggest 
threat to the effective use of ICS: external misalignment.”101 The chal-
lenge then, as Cole sees it, is one of expanding the community of indi-
viduals and organizations familiar with ICS, assisted by standardizing the 
ICS model while at the same time allowing for continual feedback and 
improvement. To meet these challenges, Cole emphasizes the need for 
expansive training and practice in ICS.102 Cole also makes three systemic 
recommendations: (1) “Establish a multi-disciplinary national systems 
management process to ensure the integrity and consistency of imple-
mentation of ICS”; (2) “Develop a strategy for promoting ICS as the 
standardized model for emergency incident management”; and (3) “Insti-
tutionalize an ongoing systems evaluation process.”103 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 212–13. 
 98. The 122 respondents to this questionnaire had an average of 26.6 years of experience with 
fire service and 17.7 years with using ICS. Id. at 215. 
 99. Respondents rated each attribute individually on a scale from one (maximum weakness) to 
ten (maximum strength), without regard to ranking attributes against each other. Id. 
 100. Id. at 218–19. 
 101. Id. at 223. By “external misalignment,” Cole appears to mean failures to comprehend and 
implement ICS properly by parties that Cole describes as “uninitiated external entities,” namely, 
parties unfamiliar with ICS doctrine and practice. Id. at 224. 
 102. Cole notes in particular the need for meaningful practice, making the following observa-
tions: “Imagine trying to build a great theater ensemble or a great symphony orchestra without re-
hearsal. Imagine a championship sports team without practice. In fact, the process by which such 
teams learn is through continual movement between practice and performance.” Id. at 223. 
 103. Id. at 224–25. 
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In fact, since the Cole (2000) study, all three of these recommenda-
tions appear to have been embraced through the 2004 publication of the 
National Incident Management System, as will be explained in Part III. 
2. Bigley and Roberts (2001) 
 In 2001, social scientists Gregory Bigley and Karlene Roberts, 
respectively from the University of Washington and the University of 
California, undertook a critical study of ICS from the perspective of reli-
ability, which they submit “is becoming a vital organizational quality or 
competency.”104 Drawing from data collected systematically through in-
terviews with personnel from a large county fire department in Califor-
nia, Bigley and Roberts conclude that “ICS-based organizations may per-
form more reliably under extreme conditions than organizations founded 
on alternative approaches.”105 Bigley and Roberts suggest that this relia-
bility derives from “three main ICS factors—structuring mechanisms, 
organizational support for constrained improvisation, and cognition man-
agement methods.”106 
By “structuring mechanisms,” Bigley and Roberts refer to the fea-
tures of ICS that allow for rapidly developing and altering organizational 
structures to meet the specific and changing needs of an individual inci-
dent.107 These features include the flexible structure of ICS that allows 
for building an ICS organization from the top down, beginning with the 
incident commander and including only those components needed to 
meet incident objectives.108 On this point, data collected by Bigley and 
Roberts confirmed the concern reported by Cole about the threat of or-
ganizational “overkill,” agreeing that “overdevelopment of higher-level 
components, such as sections, branches, and divisions, can compromise 
system effectiveness.”109 Such excessive development, in the words of 
                                                 
 104. Gregory A. Bigley & Karlene H. Roberts, The Incident Command System: High-
Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1281 
(2001). Bigley and Roberts define “reliability” to mean “the capacity to continuously and effectively 
manage working conditions, even those that fluctuate widely and are extremely hazardous and un-
predictable.” Id. 
 105. Id. at 1281–82. 
 106. Id. at 1282. 
 107. Id. at 1286. Confirming this connection between structure and reliability, Peter Senge has 
observed that, for good or ill, “structure influences behavior.” PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH 
DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 42 (1990). “The systems 
perspective tells us that we must look beyond individual mistakes or bad luck to understand im-
portant problems. We must look beyond personalities and events. We must look into the underlying 
structures which shape individual actions and create the conditions where types of events become 
likely.” Id. at 42–43 (emphasis added). 
 108. For example, beyond the incident commander, most fires were reported to require ICS 
activation only for the operations section. Bigley & Roberts, supra note 104, at 1287. 
 109. Bigley and Roberts illustrated this concern with a colorful quote from one battalion chief: 
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one battalion chief quoted by Bigley and Roberts, is “not using the inci-
dent command system as designed.”110 
Another ICS factor contributing to the high reliability identified by 
Bigley and Roberts is “organizational support for constrained improvisa-
tion.”111 By this, Bigley and Roberts recognize that complex and dynam-
ic systems are never fully comprehensible by any one member of an or-
ganization. As such, all supervisors, including the incident commander, 
must allow subordinates a degree of latitude to improvise.112 Improvisa-
tion may mean creative use of a set of tools, as with the available equip-
ment on a fire truck, or it may mean a form of breaking the rules, varying 
from routine or standard operating procedures.113 However, for purposes 
of reliability, Bigley and Roberts note that improvisation must be con-
strained within certain limits. Within the ICS context, for example, im-
provisation will not tolerate “freelancing,” the conduct by individuals or 
organizations acting wholly outside of the ICS command structure.114 
A final ICS factor contributing to high reliability is what Bigley and 
Roberts call “cognition management methods.”115 These are methods by 
which any individual member of an organization builds and maintains a 
viable understanding of the system to which they belong. Maintaining 
this understanding can be particularly challenging in many ICS contexts 
such as emergencies and disasters, where the rapidly changing needs of 
the incident are accompanied by adjustments in organizational structures. 
As Bigley and Roberts observed, ICS helps individuals meet these cogni-
tive challenges through a series of mechanisms, including a clear set of 
incident objectives and defined roles within the ICS structure to help 
maintain mental focus and avoid “cognitive overload.”116 
                                                                                                             
I’ll tell you where it doesn’t work. . . . You get some people in the incident command sys-
tem, the first thing they start doing is they start filling in bodies in all the boxes. “I’m the 
incident commander. I need operations, plans. . . . I’ll just fill in the boxes.” And there’s 
nobody left to put out the fire. 
Id. at 1287. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1286. 
 112. Concurring with Bigley and Roberts on the key role of improvisation, another researcher 
elaborated, “The discipline provided by the ICS and the improvisation required by a problem-
solving, open-system response are often assumed to be opposite ends of a linear scale. Recent expe-
rience . . . , however, suggests that these are not opposites, that agility and discipline can both be 
achieved.” John R. Harrald, Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response, 
604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 256, 267 (2006) (citing studies of successful improvisa-
tion and creativity in the 9/11 responses at the World Trade Centers and Pentagon). 
 113. Bigley & Roberts, supra note 104, at 1289. 
 114. Id. at 1290 (explaining how freelancing on a structural fire can lead to fatal consequences 
for firefighters). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1295. As one example of managing cognitive demands, Bigley and Roberts cite 
comments from one firefighter, who in the face of a structural fire may be thinking about running 
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Bigley and Roberts concluded that investing in ICS capacity 
“seems imperative for the growing number of organizations facing an 
expanding number of catastrophic scenarios.”117 At the same time, the 
study recognized that additional research was needed to ascertain the 
degree to which ICS could succeed in cases where participants did not 
share clearly defined values and organizational interests.118 
3. Buck et al. (2006) 
 In 2006, researchers from the University of Delaware published 
what may be the most comprehensive evaluation of the Incident Com-
mand System as a tool for managing disaster response activities in the 
United States.119 As compared with Cole (2000) and Bigley and Roberts 
(2001), Buck et al. (2006) expressed more reserved support for ICS, sug-
gesting that the relative success of ICS may depend on the specific char-
acteristics of an incident, the location where it is used, and the organiza-
tions who may be called upon to use it. 
Synthesizing from an expansive review of the literature, as well as 
from primary data collected from members of FEMA’s Urban Search 
and Rescue teams, Buck et al. identify several factors that they suggest 
predict an effective use of ICS. The first factor may be a type of incident 
where responders operate with established tactics, including technical 
aspects of ICS. Buck et al. cite the response by the Oklahoma City Fire 
Department to the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building as a 
case where ICS “worked effectively,” in part because the “command 
staff was well trained in ICS.”120 As a second factor predicting ICS suc-
cess, Buck et al. suggest that responders should have a “shared vision of 
the response through planning, practice, and experience.”121 An example 
given here was the ICS response to the bombing at the 1996 Summer 
Olympics in Atlanta, for which responding agencies, including the FBI 
and the Georgia Bureau of Investigations, had specifically practiced 
months in advance.122 A third factor predicting ICS success for Buck et 
al. is a response community, one characterized by a common language, 
common purposes, and personal ties developed over time through shared 
                                                                                                             
low on fuel in a chainsaw, while at the same time the truck captain is anticipating needs for addition-
al manpower. Id. at 1292. 
 117. Id. at 1297. 
 118. Id. at 1295–96. Such cases may include, for example, oil spills, where the ICS organiza-
tion may encompass both government regulators and a responsible party. See discussion infra Part 
III.D. 
 119. Buck, supra note 57, at 1. 
 120. Id. at 7. 
 121. Id. at 12. 
 122. Id. 
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experiences. For Buck et al., the ICS response to the Northridge Earth-
quake in 1994 succeeded “because the local responders were part of a 
greater Los Angeles response community . . . nurtured over a number of 
years by the California Office of Emergency Services.”123 
While identifying factors that predict ICS success, Buck et al. also 
suggest conditions where ICS deployments might prove more challeng-
ing. These include incidents where boundaries are diffuse, defying ef-
forts to establish perimeter control. One example offered here was the 
uncoordinated response to the 2003 crash of the space shuttle Columbia, 
which disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana upon re-entry to Earth’s 
atmosphere. In the response to that incident, no central control appeared 
over the collection of shuttle debris by local residents for at least the first 
few days, hampering the accident investigation.124 Similarly, according 
to Buck et al.,125 ICS responses may be hampered by cultural differences 
among responders, as with the Humberto Vidal gas explosion in Puerto 
Rico in 1996,126 and by an assault of untrained volunteers who arrive at a 
disaster scene eager but ill prepared to help, as with the 2007 oil spill 
from the Cosco Busan.127 
Buck et al. conclude that “ICS works well when official responders 
have trained in ICS and have a strong sense of community.”128 The study 
also agrees with practitioners and prior researchers that “the deficiencies 
identified are not inherent in ICS but rather are related to inadequate im-
                                                 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. Id. at 11, 20. 
 126. On November 21, 1996, at about 8:30 a.m., a leak from a propane gas pipeline resulted in 
a massive explosion in a commercial district in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The explosion destroyed the 
Humberto Vidal building and caused thirty-three deaths and several dozen more injuries. Local 
police and fire departments responded instantly and, within half an hour of the explosion, an ICS 
structure was established with the appointment of an incident commander. While the search for 
possible survivors within the building rubble was an immediate need, a clash of languages, back-
grounds, and cultures may have risen instantly as Urban Search and Rescue teams arrived on the 
island that same day from such distant locales as Florida, New York, and California. See NAT’L 
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., PIPELINE ACCIDENT REPORT: SAN JUAN GAS COMPANY, INC. / ENRON CORP. 
PROPANE GAS EXPLOSION IN SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, ON NOVEMBER 21, 1996, at 9–11 (1997), 
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1997/PAR9701.pdf. 
 127. On November 7, 2007, a spill in San Francisco Bay occurred when the container ship 
Cosco Busan grazed a tower of the Bay Bridge, causing a gash in the side of the vessel that released 
some 58,000 gallons of oil into the water. In response, some 1,200 volunteers appeared on beaches 
to assist with cleanup efforts, prompting new, streamlined procedures for health and safety training 
and new state planning to ensure more effective integration and coordination of volunteer efforts in 
the future. See Robert Selna et al., Volunteers Rush Through Training, Start Cleanup, SFGATE.COM 
(Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/11/13/MN24TB2L0.DTL; 
see also California Volunteers Disaster Corps, CAL. VOLUNTEERS, http://www.californiavolun 
teers.org/index.php/calvol/program_DisasterCorps/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 128. Buck, supra note 57, at 21. 
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plementation.”129 The remedy for these deficiencies may thus lie outside 
of ICS itself. Such remedies may, in fact, be found within allied systems 
such as the National Incident Management System, which specifies train-
ing requirements for ICS positions.130 
As all responders and reviewers appear to agree, the Incident 
Command System is not perfect. Yet over time, ICS has proven itself as 
a highly reliable system for managing disasters, emergencies, and other 
incidents requiring coordinated efforts within and among organizations. 
As the following Part will show, since 2001, ICS has endured and 
evolved through some of the most challenging trials in American history, 
including 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. 
III. LAW AND APPLICATION OF THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
While the Incident Command System has been known in the re-
sponse community for four decades now, it has become widely applied 
only within the past decade or two. Prompted by national catastrophes 
including 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon, the use 
of ICS grew rapidly within the last ten years, propelled by forces includ-
ing public outrage, executive order, and legislative changes. This Part 
will examine the evolving and expanding applications of ICS in the 
United States propelled by such forces. 
A. ICS and Response to Oil and Hazardous Substances 
One type of case where ICS has long been the rule is responses to 
oil spills and releases of hazardous substances into the environment. In-
cidents such as the Enbridge oil spill in Michigan and the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico are subject to federal statutes in-
cluding the Clean Water Act,131 Oil Pollution Act,132 and the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),133 better known as “Superfund.” Environmental responses 
under these three statutes are guided by one set of federal regulations 
known as the “National Contingency Plan” (NCP).134 
                                                 
 129. Id. 
 130. See ICS Resource Center, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://training.fema.gov/ 
EMIWeb/IS/ICSResource/TrainingMaterials.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 131. See generally Clean Water Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2010). 
 132. See generally Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006).  
 133. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2010). 
 134. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 
(2010). In a twist on administrative law, which generally assumes that statutes come before their 
implementing regulations, the first National Contingency Plan actually predates the modern Clean 
Water Act, CERCLA, and the Oil Pollution Act. The original NCP was developed in response to a 
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Prompted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and passage of the 
Oil Pollution Act in 1990,135 the EPA amended the NCP in 1994 for pur-
poses including adoption of the Incident Command System for oil and 
hazardous substances responses.136 While the NCP provides only a fleet-
ing direct reference to the “Incident Command System,”137 the NCP ex-
pressly embraces the ICS concept of unified command.138 By emphasiz-
ing unified command, the EPA signaled that its version of ICS “is not 
one of the several systems currently in use by local fire fighters around 
the country and separately referred to as ‘the’ traditional incident com-
mand system.”139 Under “traditional” ICS, a single incident would be 
handled by a single incident commander. By contrast, under a unified 
command structure, a single incident may be handled by two or more 
incident commanders, working together as unified command to achieve a 
common set of objectives.140 In the ICS response to the 2010 Enbridge 
oil spill, for example, unified command included the EPA, the Michigan 
                                                                                                             
massive oil spill from the tanker Torrey Canyon off the coast of England in 1967, leading the United 
States to realize the need for a comprehensive system of spill reporting and response. See National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). Following the 
1968 publication of the NCP, passage of the modern Clean Water Act in 1972, CERCLA in 1980, 
and OPA in 1990 embraced requirements of the NCP and required amendments to it. See Clean 
Water Act § 311(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(1) (2010) (“The President shall prepare and publish a 
National Contingency Plan for removal of oil and hazardous substances . . . .”); CERCLA § 105(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (“Within one hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, the President 
shall . . . revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of oil and hazardous 
substances . . . .”). 
 135. The Exxon Valdez oil spill into Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989 prompted Con-
gress to pass the Oil Pollution Act in 1990. “OPA 90” passed by unanimous vote, following almost 
fifteen years of failed efforts to achieve similar legislation before the Exxon Valdez spill. See 
RUSSELL V. RANDLE, OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 3 (1991). 
 136. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384 
(Sept. 15, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (2010)). 
 137. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.150(a) (2010) (“The National Response System [of which the NCP 
was a part] meets the requirements . . . concerning use of an incident command system.”). The ICS 
“requirements” cited in the NCP refer to worker health and safety regulations promulgated by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q)(3)(i)–(ix) 
(2010). Among other requirements, the OSHA regulations provide, “The senior emergency response 
official responding to an emergency shall become the individual in charge of a site-specific Incident 
Command System (ICS). All emergency responders and their communications shall be coordinated 
and controlled through the individual in charge of the ICS . . . .” Id. § 1910.120(q)(3)(i). 
 138. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.105(d) (2010) (“The basic framework for the response man-
agement structure is a system (e.g., a unified command system) that brings together the functions of 
the Federal government, the state government, and the responsible party to achieve an effective and 
efficient response, where the [on-scene coordinator] maintains authority.” (emphasis added)); see 
also id. at Fig. 1a (depicting a “Unified Command Structure”). 
 139. 59 Fed. Reg. at 47,387 pmbl. 
 140. EPA ICS HANDBOOK, supra note 61. 
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Department of Natural Resources and Environment, the City of Battle 
Creek, and Enbridge (as the responsible party).141 
Having a party, such as Enbridge, that is legally responsible for an 
incident working alongside regulatory agencies within unified command 
obviously raises issues of law, legal ethics, and public perceptions.142 On 
the other hand, having the responsible party on board may provide ready 
access to resources and experts that are beyond the ready reach of gov-
ernment. In any case, consistent with the National Contingency Plan, the 
Incident Command System remains the rule in the United States for inte-
grated responses to oil spills and hazardous substances. 
B. ICS and Response to 9/11 
1. ICS on 9/11 
Some thirty years after the creation of the Incident Command Sys-
tem, the events of September 11, 2001, tragically demonstrated how un-
coordinated responses to disasters may exacerbate injuries and losses of 
life. In its extraordinary accounting of the events leading up to and fol-
lowing the terrorist attacks on that day, the 9/11 Commission acknowl-
edged the astounding heroics and the staggering losses of life among 
agencies responding on 9/11.143 At the same time, the Commission also 
documented how failures of incident command and communications 
hampered the response and likely led to greater casualties and other im-
pacts. 
Two months before 9/11, Mayor Giuliani issued a directive, “Direc-
tion and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York,” which pro-
moted ICS concepts such as unified command and the designation of 
incident commanders.144 After a meticulous review of the record, the 
Commission concluded that it was “clear, however, that the response 
operations” at the World Trade Center, “lacked the kind of integrated 
communications and unified command contemplated in the directive.”145 
                                                 
 141. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLLUTION / SITUATION REPORT: KALAMAZOO RIVER / 
ENBRIDGE SPILL—REMOVAL POLREP-SITREP (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
enbridgespill/pdfs/sitreps/20100819_sitrep27.pdf. 
 142. See infra note 389 (speculating about BP’s motives in the Deepwater Horizon response). 
 143. 9/11 COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. On 9/11, the Fire 
Department of New York (FDNY) suffered 343 fatalities, the single largest loss of life of any emer-
gency response agency in history. This was followed by thirty-seven fatalities among the Port Au-
thority Police Department (PAPD), which ranks as the highest loss of any police force in history. 
The New York Police Department (NYPD) lost twenty-three people on that day, which ranks as the 
second highest loss among any police force. Id. at 311. 
 144. Id. at 319. 
 145. Id. 
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Despite the directive’s call for unified command, “the FDNY and NYPD 
each considered itself operationally autonomous.”146 Of course, beyond 
the FDNY and NYPD, the response to the World Trade Center attacks 
was supported—and complicated—by agencies from all levels of gov-
ernment: federal, state, and local.147 In general, the Commission observed 
that “incident commanders from responding agencies lacked knowledge 
of what other agencies and, in some cases, their own responders were 
doing.”148 In some cases, this lack of knowledge led to direct conse-
quences on 9/11. For example, after the South Tower collapsed at 9:58 
a.m., many chiefs and firefighters in the North Tower remained unaware 
and perished when the North Tower collapsed twenty-nine minutes lat-
er.149 
While the extraordinary circumstances of both the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 defy comparisons, the Commission did 
note some differences in the responses to each attack. The Commission 
observed: 
While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 
terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three rea-
sons: first, the strong professional relationships and trust established 
among emergency responders; second, the adoption of the Incident 
Command System; and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to 
response.150 
The Commission specifically credited the Incident Command Sys-
tem with helping Pentagon responders to overcome “the inherent com-
plications of a response across jurisdictions.”151 As in New York, the at-
                                                 
 146. Id. at 285. For a detailed examination of the communication failures and cultural gaps 
between the FDNY and NYPD hampering the response on 9/11, see Jim Dwyer et al., 9/11 Exposed 
Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, at A1. 
 147. Principal first responders to the World Trade Center on 9/11 were the FDNY, NYPD, 
PAPD, and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
143, at 281. However, in addition to these agencies, other responding agencies included FEMA and 
the New York City Department of Health, id. at 293, along with the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation. See, e.g., Walter E. Mugdan, Environmental Law Issues Raised by 
Terrorist Events in 2001, 7 ALBANY L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 67 (2002) (noting the observations and 
analysis from the Regional Counsel of EPA Region 2 in New York). 
 148. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 305. 
 149. Id. at 307–08. Of course, had all responders in the North Tower known of the collapse of 
the South Tower, it is not likely that they all would have evacuated. However, several surviving 
firefighters later expressed belief that they and others would have evacuated more urgently had they 
known of the South Tower’s collapse. Id. at 307. 
 150. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). Concurring in this assessment, one scholarly study conclud-
ed, “The use of ICS and unified command in the Pentagon incident response was in many ways a 
textbook example of high effectiveness.” Buck, supra note 57, at 6. 
 151. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 314. 
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tack on the Pentagon prompted response across disciplines (e.g., fire, law 
enforcement) and at all levels of government.152 Consistent with ICS, the 
Pentagon response was overseen by an incident commander, provided by 
the Arlington County Fire Department, and an incident command post 
was promptly established near the crash site to allow assessment of the 
situation at all times.153 
Despite the relative success of the Pentagon response, Arlington 
County’s “after-action report” identified significant problems with inci-
dent command.154 These included confusion over the names for organiza-
tional units and difficulties caused by freelancing units self-dispatching 
to the scene.155 Acknowledging the successes and failures with the re-
sponses at both the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the 9/11 Commis-
sion concluded that “the problems in command, control, and communica-
tions that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of 
similar scale. The task looking forward is to enable first responders to 
respond in a coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of 
the situation.”156 To meet this challenge directly, the 9/11 Commission 
offered the following recommendation: “Emergency response agencies 
nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When 
multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should 
adopt a unified command. Both are proven frameworks for emergency 
response.”157 
                                                 
 152. Agencies responding to the Pentagon attack included, for example, the FBI, FEMA, the 
Virginia State Police, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and the fire departments 
of Alexandria, Fairfax County, and the District of Columbia. Id. 
 153. Id. at 314–15. 
 154. See generally ARLINGTON CNTY., AFTER-ACTION REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON, available at http://www.arlingtonva.us/ 
departments/Fire/Documents/after_report.pdf. 
 155. Id. at A-25–26. 
 156. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 315. 
 157. Id. at 397. In addition to this express endorsement of ICS for government agencies, more 
subtly, the 9/11 Commission also indicated support for adoption of ICS in the private sector. In a 
separate recommendation, the 9/11 Commission endorsed “the American National Standard Insti-
tute’s recommended standard for private preparedness” as a means of promoting employee safety, 
business continuity, and protection of critical infrastructure. Id. at 398. This recommended standard, 
which encourages voluntary use of ICS, was developed by the National Fire Protection Agency 
(NFPA) and is known as “NFPA 1600.” See NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 1600: STANDARD ON 
DISASTER/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROGRAMS, at Annex E (2007 
ed.), available at http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/nfpa1600.pdf. For a more detailed examina-
tion of NFPA 1600 as a voluntary preparedness standard, see Nicholson, Seeking Consensus, supra 
note 43, at 534–40. 
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2. ICS After 9/11 
In short order, the Commission’s recommendation for adopting ICS 
nationwide was accepted and mandated by the federal government. In 
2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, signed into law on 
November 25, 2002.158 Most famously, the Homeland Security Act es-
tablished the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),159 created 
through a massive reorganization and consolidation of federal workers 
from twenty-two agencies,160 including FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
Less visibly, but consistent with the 9/11 Commission’s recommenda-
tion, the Homeland Security Act also set in motion a process leading to 
the effective mandate of the Incident Command System nationwide. 
Through the Homeland Security Act, Congress charged DHS with 
“building a comprehensive incident management system with Federal, 
State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to re-
spond to [terrorist] attacks and disasters.”161 Four months later, on Febru-
ary 28, 2003, the President acted in furtherance of this charge by issuing 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5).162 HSPD-5 di-
rected the Secretary of Homeland Security to “develop . . . and adminis-
ter a National Incident Management System.”163 NIMS was intended to 
provide a “consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local 
governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, 
size, or complexity.”164 Importantly, HSPD-5 required that the National 
Incident Management System “include a core set of concepts . . . cover-
ing the incident command system.”165 
The Secretary of Homeland Security took on the charge of develop-
ing the National Incident Management System (incorporating ICS) with 
breathtaking speed for a burgeoning bureaucracy, issuing a final NIMS 
document on March 1, 2004.166 Upon the issuance of this NIMS docu-
ment, HSPD-5 required all federal agencies to implement the Incident 
Command System for domestic incidents. 
                                                 
 158. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified at 
6 U.S.C. §§101–557 (2010)). 
 159. 6 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2010). 
 160. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Highlights a More Secure America on 
First Anniversary of Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 2, 2004), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040302-4.html. 
 161. 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(5) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 162. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Sec. Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 (Feb. 28, 
2003) [hereinafter HSPD-5], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html. 
 163. Id. ¶ 15. 
 164. Id.; see also NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22. 
 165. HSPD-5, supra note 162, ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
 166. See Nicholson, Seeking Consensus, supra note 43, at 492–94 & nn.10–30. 
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On its face, HSPD-5, as a federal directive, only applies to federal 
departments and agencies. However, HSPD-5 also invokes the mighty 
power of the federal purse to effectively compel adoption of NIMS and 
ICS by all levels of government. In brief but powerful terms, HSPD-5 
specifically provided, “Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal depart-
ments and agencies shall make adoption of the [National Incident Man-
agement System] a requirement . . . for providing Federal preparedness 
assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities.”167 In September 
2004, while rolling out this new condition for federal funding, DHS de-
clared that “ICS is a critical component of the NIMS” and called for na-
tionwide adoption of the Incident Command System in unequivocal 
terms: 
If State, territorial, tribal, and local entities are not already using 
ICS, you must institutionalize the use of ICS (consistent with the 
concepts and principles taught by DHS) across the entire response 
system . . . . All Federal, State, territory, tribal, and local jurisdic-
tions will be required to adopt ICS in order to be compliant with 
NIMS.168 
By the time DHS issued this unequivocal mandate, the ICS concept 
was already thirty years old. NIMS, however, was new, with a broader 
objective to help prevent and mitigate the impacts of all incidents, 
providing a systematic approach to training and exercises, personnel 
qualifications, equipment certification, information management, mutual 
aid agreements, research and development, and other preparedness 
measures.169 In view of the sweeping scope of NIMS, local governments 
and other stakeholders complained about the federal mandate to begin 
complying with NIMS in the very year that NIMS was published. 170 
Despite the federal mandate and the growing adoption of the Inci-
dent Command System across the country, the changes in incident man-
agement inspired by 9/11 required time to take root. Unfortunately, in the 
very year that the National Incident Management System was being 
                                                 
 167. HSPD-5, supra note 162, ¶ 20. 
 168. Letter from Tom Ridge, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to State Governors (Sept. 8, 
2004), reprinted in Nicholson, Seeking Consensus, supra note 43, at 555–59. To clarify the criteria 
for NIMS compliance, HSPD-5 also directed the DHS Secretary to “develop standards and guide-
lines for determining whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS.” HSPD-5, supra note 
162, ¶ 20. These standards may be identified today through the NIMS Resource Center, managed by 
FEMA and available on-line at www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/. 
 169. See generally NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 7–8. 
 170. By one estimate, upon its initial publication, NIMS had “518 measurable requirements,” 
making compliance by the start of fiscal year 2006 “a Herculean and perhaps unreasonable task.” 
Nicholson, Seeking Consensus, supra note 43, at 547 (quoting Los Angeles County Fire Chief Mi-
chael Freeman). 
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rolled out to the country, the Gulf Coast states were struck by the single 
most destructive disaster in American history.171  
C. ICS and Hurricane Katrina 
Whatever else might be said about Hurricane Katrina, it cannot be 
said that we failed to see it coming. Unlike the sudden and shocking at-
tacks on 9/11, Katrina developed predictably under the watchful eyes of 
weather forecasters, forming as a tropical depression on August 23, 
2005.172 On Friday, August 26, the National Hurricane Center issued a 
warning that Hurricane Katrina appeared to be headed for New Orle-
ans.173 On Saturday, the massive evacuation of New Orleans began, with 
more than a million residents leaving the area in just over twenty-four 
hours.174 When Katrina made landfall in the early morning of Monday, 
August 29, 2005, television crews were in place to capture it as a live, 
televised event.175 
New Orleans may have been the hardest hit, but the storm’s surge 
reached all the way across the Gulf Coast from Texas to central Flori-
da.176 In terms of land mass, “Katrina laid waste to some 90,000 square 
miles, an area the size of the United Kingdom.”177 In terms of lives, at 
least 1,836 people died as a result of the hurricane and the ensuing 
floods. In terms of economic losses, Katrina far exceeded the damage 
from the 9/11 terror attacks or any other single disaster to strike the Unit-
ed States.178 Indeed, Hurricane Katrina in many ways defied convention-
                                                 
 171. While Hurricane Katrina will always overshadow the narrative and memories of 2005 for 
most people, the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season also produced a record fifteen hurricanes, including 
the most Category Five hurricanes in a single season: Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. ROBERT R.M. 
VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 225 
(2010). 
 172. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 22. 
 173. Id. In addition to warnings through regular channels, Max Mayfield, Director of the Na-
tional Hurricane Center, also took the extraordinary step of personally calling the governors of the 
affected states on the weekend before hurricane landfall. Id. at 5. 
 174. Id. at 24. 
 175. For an extraordinarily detailed daily accounting of Hurricane Katrina from tropical de-
pression to landfall, see THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: 
LESSONS LEARNED (2006) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED]. For a humanizing and harrowing view 
of these same events, from the perspective of one family who evacuated from New Orleans and their 
father who stayed behind, see DAVE EGGERS, ZEITOUN (2009). 
 176. VERCHICK, supra note 171, at 2. 
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 178. In 2005 dollars, Hurricane Katrina was estimated to have caused economic damages of 
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Hurricane Andrew (the next most destructive hurricane) was estimated to have caused $48.5 billion 
in damages. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 37. 
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al metrics and genre; for lawyers and legal scholars, it even helped usher 
in the new field of disaster law.179 
Given the sheer scale of Hurricane Katrina, it is doubtful that even 
the best plans and policies, flawlessly implemented, could have spared 
the region from devastating impacts. The collective response to Katrina, 
however, was far from flawless. The infamously anemic response to 
Katrina was even more incomprehensible in that it was anticipated not 
just by weather forecasters six days before landfall, but by a whole suite 
of policymakers, engineers, emergency professionals, and others months 
and even years in advance.180 In 2004, the year before Katrina hit, feder-
al, state, and local officials had even participated in a planning exercise, 
dubbed “Hurricane Pam,” that specifically anticipated massive flooding 
in New Orleans.181 In April 2005, the Department of Homeland Security 
sponsored a large-scale exercise, “Top Officials 3” (TOPOFF 3), involv-
ing responders from all levels of government in a scenario implementing 
the newly minted National Incident Management System. According to a 
report by the Homeland Security Inspector General, the TOPOFF exer-
cise revealed “a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles and 
protocols set forth in . . . NIMS.”182 This lack of understanding for the 
National Incident Management System reflected resoundingly in the re-
sponse to Hurricane Katrina four months later. 
Through all the official post-mortems that followed Katrina, includ-
ing voluminous reports from the U.S. Senate,183 the House of Repre-
sentatives,184 and the White House,185 the lack of planning, coordination, 
and leadership was noted at every level of government. Part of the prob-
lem could be explained by the massive shifts in governmental organiza-
tion and orientation that had been wrought by 9/11. These shifts included 
                                                 
 179. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 16, at xxi (noting that in the years since Katrina (2005) 
and the first edition of the DISASTER LAW (2006), “courses on disaster issues have begun to spring 
up around the country, and a small, but growing, body of legal scholarship has emerged”). 
 180. As the Senate committee noted, the potentially devastating threat of a catastrophic hurri-
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tance with hurricane planning. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 4. 
 181. Id. After “Hurricane Pam” in 2004, lessons learned were still being translated in draft 
plans in 2005 when the real Hurricane Katrina struck later that year. Id. 
 182. Id. at 552. 
 183. See id. (spanning 732 pages). 
 184. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE 
TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. NO. 109-377 (2006) 
[hereinafter A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE]. 
 185. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 175, at ch. 3, n.130. 
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the placement of FEMA under the Department of Homeland Security;186 
the DHS creation of a new coordinating figure, the “principal federal 
official,” notwithstanding the federal coordinating officer established by 
the Stafford Act;187 and an overall national emphasis on terrorist 
threats.188 
As with the Homeland Security Act in the year following 9/11, 
Congress stepped in the year after Hurricane Katrina with new legisla-
tion: the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (Post-
Katrina Act).189 The new law attempted to fix a number of the problems 
identified with the Katrina response—even if it meant undoing some of 
the “reforms” in response to 9/11. The Post-Katrina Act, for example, 
gave FEMA a measure of autonomy within DHS,190 designated the 
FEMA Administrator as a direct advisor to the President,191 and affirmed 
FEMA’s primary mission to “reduce the loss of life and property and 
protect the Nation from all hazards.”192 
One thing the Post-Katrina Act did not do, however, was alter the 
fundamental, nationwide mandate to adopt the National Incident Man-
agement System, including the Incident Command System. Quite the 
contrary, the post-mortems recognized that major deficiencies in the 
Katrina response often simply reflected failures to implement the Inci-
dent Command System properly. In particular, critical reviews later 
                                                 
 186. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 552. 
 187. Id.; see Stafford Act § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 5143(a) (2010) (“Immediately upon his decla-
ration of a major disaster or emergency, the President shall appoint a Federal coordinating officer to 
operate in the affected area.”). Where he deems necessary, the President shall also request the Gov-
ernor of an affected State to appoint a State coordinating officer for purposes of coordinating state 
and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal government. Id. § 5143(c). 
 188. Commenters on draft versions of NIMS had specifically voiced concerns that the new 
government policies focused too heavily on terrorism, to the possible loss of attention for natural 
disasters and other hazards. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus, supra note 43, at 491–97. Consistent 
with that focus, the TOPOFF 3 exercise, four months before Katrina, involved over 10,000 partici-
pants from federal, state, tribal, and local agencies, as well as the private sector, all engaged in a 
training scenario involving terrorist strikes. See The TOPOFF 3 Full-Scale Exercise, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/training/editorial_0594.shtm (last visited May 30, 2012). 
 189. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 
Stat. 1355 (2006) [hereinafter Post-Katrina Act] (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
 190. Among other things, the Post-Katrina Act recognized FEMA as a “distinct entity” with 
DHS; exempted FEMA from DHS reorganizational authority; and limited DHS’s authority to reduce 
FEMA’s responsibilities or divert its resources. See 6 U.S.C. § 316(a)–(c) (2010). 
 191. Id. § 313(c)(4). For a reflection of the widely panned performance of FEMA head Mi-
chael Brown (also known as “Heckuva Job Brownie”) during Hurricane Katrina, see, for example, A 
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 556. The Post-Katrina Act also included extraordinary 
provisions to establish some minimal level of qualifications for appointment as FEMA Administra-
tor. See 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (stating the FEMA Administrator must have “demonstrated ability in 
and knowledge of emergency management” and “not less than 5 years of executive leadership and 
management experience”). 
 192. 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
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found that the Katrina response failed to meet the ICS principles of unity 
of command and unified command. Behind these two concepts is an in-
tention and expectation that proper use of ICS “clarifies reporting rela-
tionships and eliminates confusion caused by multiple, and potentially 
conflicting, directions and actions.”193 
Unity of command, the ICS principle that each individual reports to 
one and only one supervisor,194 proved challenging and elusive as 9/11 
reforms and reorganizations created an abundance of officials with un-
clear lines of reporting. These included the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, the head of FEMA, the DHS principal federal official (PFO), and 
the Stafford Act’s federal coordinating officer (FCO). In the early days 
of the Katrina response, Michael Brown served as both the head of 
FEMA and the designated PFO—a “dual-hatted” role that the Senate 
committee later found in express violation of federal policy.195 When 
Brown was shortly relieved of duty after Katrina, the second principal 
federal official, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, “went operational,”196 
again in conflict with official doctrine as well as the Stafford Act, which 
recognizes only the federal coordinating officer as the federal official in 
charge of field operations. This confusion of authority between the PFO 
and the FCO, a violation of the principle of unity of command, was re-
solved only when Allen was subsequently appointed as both federal co-
ordinating officer and the principal federal official.197 Addressing this 
confusion directly, Congress through the Post-Katrina Act later provided 
that the “Principal Federal Official . . . shall not – (A) direct or replace 
the incident command structure established at the incident; or (B) have 
directive authority over the . . . Federal Coordinating Officer, or other 
Federal and State officials.”198 Accordingly, the new law affirmed and 
strengthened support for both the Incident Command System and the 
federal coordinating officer acting within it. 
Beyond the confusion of authority at the federal level during the 
Katrina response, there was widespread confusion of authority at all lev-
els of government. At the local level, this confusion of authority, contra-
ry to the principle of unity of command, may have resulted in truly tragic 
                                                 
 193. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 175, at 13. 
 194. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 195. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 556. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 66 (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK] 
(“Once formally designated for an ongoing incident, a PFO relinquishes the conduct of all previous 
duties to focus exclusively on his or her incident management responsibilities.”). 
 196. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 189. 
 197. More than just a confusion of position titles and reporting obligations, liabilities could 
arise from an individual exceeding his legal authority to obligate funds. See id. at 190 (“Only the 
FCO has authority to obligate money.”). 
 198. 6 U.S.C. § 319(c)(2) (2010). 
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consequences. At the Superdome, for example, where more than 20,000 
evacuees had gathered and both the National Guard and the New Orleans 
Police Department had established a presence, there was no consensus on 
who was in charge, with both agencies denying lead responsibility.199 
Similarly, at the Cloverleaf, an elevated highway structure where up to 
7,000 people had gathered, senior officials for both the National Guard 
and state police did not know who was supposed to be in charge.200 Out-
side of these central locations, in areas where the Red Cross attempted to 
establish emergency shelters, the Red Cross was denied access by local 
law enforcement.201 Agency squabbles and confusion over command lit-
erally deprived people of shelter and left lives hanging in the balance. 
Beyond the failures of unity of command, Katrina revealed wide-
spread failures with establishing a unified command.202 In Louisiana, 
unified command was attempted, at least initially, to include the FCO 
from FEMA, a state coordinating officer (SCO) from the Louisiana Of-
fice of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and a defense 
coordinating officer (DCO) from the U.S. Department of Defense.203 As 
unified command, these three officials should have established and main-
tained control of field operations in Louisiana, but they did not. Instead, 
command was hindered, as on 9/11, by freelancing agencies “just show-
ing up” or agencies bypassing the command structure.204 For example, 
the head of Louisiana’s National Guard bypassed unified command and 
requested troops directly through the National Guard Bureau and the De-
partment of Defense.205 
Part of the failure of unified command in Louisiana could be at-
tributed to the direct hit the state took from Hurricane Katrina and the 
breach of the levees that followed. Part of the failure could be attributed 
to our American system of federalism,206 with the federal government 
infamously waiting for state and local officials—overwhelmed and often 
victims of the hurricane themselves207—to issue proper requests for fed-
                                                 
 199. See A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 185. 
 200. Id. at 186. 
 201. Id. at 349. 
 202. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (unified command). 
 203. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 561. 
 204. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 189. 
 205. Id. at 561–62. 
 206. See Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in 
the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 532 (2007) (“While the President’s senior 
advisers fiddled with federalism, New Orleans drowned.”). 
 207. Among other local impacts, the City of New Orleans had to abandon its emergency opera-
tions center when City Hall flooded, cutting off power from emergency generators. Numerous other 
local operations centers, including the headquarters for the Louisiana National Guard, also had to be 
abandoned due to flooding. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 185. 
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eral support.208 Part of the failure could be explained by a lack of person-
nel needed to support the ICS structure, both in terms of numbers and in 
terms of key individuals.209 But according to the Senate report, 
“[p]erhaps the most significant reason for the failure to establish unified 
command in Louisiana is the lack of NIMS . . . training.”210 Indeed, as 
the Senate report noted, “the state brought in consultants a few days after 
Katrina made landfall to give basic ICS courses to [civilian response per-
sonnel] and to members of the Louisiana National Guard.”211 
In contrast with Louisiana, the State of Mississippi appeared to 
demonstrate considerably more success with its response to Hurricane 
Katrina. This success was attributed, in part, to “extensive prior training 
on the Incident Command System received by state and local responders 
in Mississippi.”212 Of course, successful responses to Katrina were also 
demonstrated by other state and federal agencies, most notably the U.S. 
Coast Guard, for whom training represents a fundamental qualification 
for duty.213 
After Katrina, in its “Lessons Learned” report, the White House 
reemphasized the critical need for training, specifically recommending 
that the Department of Homeland Security “institute a formal training 
program on the NIMS . . . for all department and agency personnel with 
incident management responsibilities.”214 In issuing this recommenda-
tion, the White House cogently observed, “The key to the implementa-
tion of ICS is training.”215 Through the Post-Katrina Act of 2006, Con-
gress adopted the recommendation of the White House and the House 
and Senate reports by establishing the National Integration Center within 
FEMA.216 As established by Congress, the National Integration Center 
                                                 
 208. As the House Select Bipartisan Committee observed, “[F]aith in federalism alone cannot 
sanctify a dysfunctional system in which DHS and FEMA simply wait for requests for aid that state 
and local officials may be unable or unwilling to convey.” Id. at x. 
 209. A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, supra note 1, at 563. 
 210. Id. at 562. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 564. In fact, the state coordinating officer for Mississippi was critical of the weak 
knowledge of NIMS and ICS exhibited by federal responders, reporting, “I don’t think most people 
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storm.” Id. at 27. Less famously, another distinguished Katrina response agency was the Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, the state’s lead agency for search and rescue, which rescued 
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 214. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 175, at 89. 
 215. Id. Hammering home the point, the White House report expressly declared, “All depart-
ments and agencies should undertake an aggressive ICS training program for all personnel who may 
deploy during a disaster. It is essential that personnel have a working knowledge of ICS before a 
disaster occurs.” Id. 
 216. See 6 U.S.C. § 319(a) (2010). 
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“shall ensure ongoing management and maintenance of the National In-
cident Management System . . . and any successor to such system or 
plan.”217 
Given all the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and the em-
phatic conclusions from the White House and both houses of Congress, it 
should be no surprise that training in NIMS and the Incident Command 
System accelerated in the years following Katrina. But would there be 
enough people trained well enough—and soon enough—to use the Inci-
dent Command System properly during the next big disaster? Five years 
after Katrina, the United States would face the next major trial of ICS. 
D. ICS and the Deepwater Horizon 
Officially, no one saw this coming. When British Petroleum (BP) 
submitted their exploration plan for the Macondo well in the Gulf of 
Mexico in February 2009, they asserted that it is “unlikely that an acci-
dental oil spill release would occur from the proposed activities.”218 In 
April 2009, the former Minerals Management Service of the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior approved BP’s plan with a “categorical exclu-
sion” under the National Environmental Policy Act.219 With hindsight, 
one commentator remarked, “What we had here was willful blind-
ness.”220 
Twelve months after BP’s plan was approved, the “unlikely” spill 
came to pass as the Macondo well was being completed deep in the wa-
ters of the Gulf of Mexico. On April 20, 2010, an explosion tore through 
the Deepwater Horizon drill rig, killing eleven crewmembers, injuring 
many others, and eventually resulting in what President Obama described 
as “the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.”221 
On April 22, 2010, two days after the explosion and fire on the 
Deepwater Horizon, the drill rig sank into the waters of the Gulf. The 
                                                 
 217. Id. § 319(b)(1). 
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next day, April 23, remotely operated vehicles one mile below the sur-
face were investigating the blow-out preventer on the Macondo well 
when they discovered oil leaking from the end of a riser pipe where it 
had broken off when the Deepwater Horizon sank.222 For at least eighty-
seven days, through Top Kill, Junk Shot, and other failed control efforts, 
oil flowed from the pipe into the Gulf of Mexico.223 How much oil 
flowed into the Gulf during this event remains uncertain. One official 
government estimate put it at approximately 205 million gallons,224 a 
volume that would make the Deepwater Horizon spill almost twenty 
times larger than that of the Exxon Valdez in 1989.225 The Deepwater 
Horizon was not only the largest oil spill in U.S. history, but also the 
largest accidental spill the world has ever seen.226 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster also triggered a response unlike 
any the world had ever seen. At its peak, the response involved more 
than 120 aircraft, 7,000 vessels, and 47,000 people.227 As lead agency, 
the U.S. Coast Guard deployed active-duty members and called up re-
servists from across the country. Responders joined in from other federal 
agencies, including the EPA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.228 Some 1,100 Na-
tional Guard troops from Louisiana supported the response effort, joined 
by scores of other federal, state, and local agencies.229 Thousands of vol-
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unteers offered to help with wildlife rescue.230 Together with BP as the 
“responsible party,” the “co-combatants” placed nearly 4 million feet of 
floating boom to capture the oil slicks,231 applied some 1.9 million gal-
lons of chemical dispersants to break up the oil,232 and relocated 25,000 
sea turtle eggs from the Gulf Coast to the Atlantic Coast of Florida.233 
Meanwhile, with the riser pipe still spewing millions of gallons of oil per 
day one mile below the surface, the President channeled the Manhattan 
Project by assembling the brightest scientists of a generation to find a 
technical solution.234 
With an army of responders including rocket scientists and shrimp 
fishermen, National Guardsmen and Audubon volunteers, uniformed 
troops and corporate executives, and with every federal, state, and local 
agency in the Gulf Coast seeming to play some role, the need for com-
mand and control on the Deepwater Horizon response could not have 
been greater. At least for a while, many seemed to wonder who was in 
charge and by what authority.235 For a region still recovering from Hurri-
cane Katrina, state governments seemed to think reflexively of FEMA 
and the Stafford Act in the face of an environmental disaster.236 They 
apparently did not immediately realize that FEMA’s money was not 
needed where the Oil Pollution Act made the responsible party liable for 
the full costs of the response,237 and the National Contingency Plan put 
the U.S. Coast Guard squarely in charge of responding to an oil spill in 
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the marine environment.238 While the legal framework may have been 
unfamiliar to some, by 2010, all levels of government should have been 
quite familiar with the operational framework for managing the response: 
the Incident Command System. 
The Incident Command System structure begins with appointment 
of an incident commander. For a spill involving oil or hazardous sub-
stances, the incident commander will likely be an on-scene coordinator 
(OSC), a position with authority under the National Contingency Plan to 
direct a response and obligate funds of the government.239 For the 
Deepwater Horizon, the first OSC was a Coast Guard captain, who as-
sumed command on the evening of the explosion and fire to initiate 
search and rescue operations. The next day, command was transferred to 
Rear Admiral Mary Landry, commander of Coast Guard District 8 (Gulf 
Coast), who served as federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC).240 On April 
22, the day the rig sank, a unified command structure was established 
including Admiral Landry plus senior executives from the former Miner-
als Management Service and BP.241 As the scope of the response broad-
ened, unified command expanded to include state OSCs from Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.242 Additional incident command posts 
were set up in Mobile, Alabama; St. Petersburg, Florida; and Houston, 
Texas.243 To provide an overall management structure, a Unified Area 
Command was stood up in Robert, Louisiana, and later moved to New 
Orleans.244 To clarify the overall command, on April 29, the Coast Guard 
declared the Deepwater Horizon a “Spill of National Significance,”245 
permitting the appointment of a National Incident Commander.246 On 
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May 1, Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano appointed the outgoing 
Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen, as National Incident 
Commander.247 
Admiral Allen knew command, the Incident Command System, and 
the National Contingency Plan. He was the highest ranking officer in the 
U.S. Coast Guard,248 with distinguished leadership on the Gulf Coast in 
response to Hurricane Katrina.249 He had even overseen a simulated Spill 
of National Significance off the coast of Louisiana in 2002.250 Other ca-
reer responders throughout the federal, state, and local governments 
knew the NCP and ICS too. If ICS and the National Incident Manage-
ment System were still new to some responders before Katrina hit in Au-
gust 2005, they were not new when the Deepwater Horizon exploded and 
sank in April 2010. This is particularly true when considering the inter-
vening experiences of Hurricane Rita in September 2005, other major 
hurricanes including Gustav and Ike in 2008, and other national disasters 
as well as training exercises.251 
Consistent with their training and experience in ICS, state on-scene 
coordinators for Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi participated in the 
Deepwater Horizon Unified Command, at least at first. However, the 
governors of these states, as well as other state and local officials, ap-
peared much less familiar with ICS and resented federal control over the 
response. Accordingly, the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and Florida declared state emergencies in response to the oil spill 
and began coordinating state response efforts outside of the unified 
command framework.252 Instead of unified command, state and local of-
ficials began creating their own response structures and plans, repudiat-
ing the area-specific oil spill response plans that they had previously de-
veloped and approved in conjunction with the federal government. Ad-
miral Allen later called this “the social and political nullification” of the 
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National Contingency Plan,253 with its ICS principles of unified com-
mand and unity of command. 
Of course, even if the National Contingency Plan was nullified so-
cially and politically, it remained legally in effect as a rule promulgated 
under statutory authority.254 Admiral Allen certainly understood this, 
along with all other participants in the Deepwater Horizon unified com-
mand, including BP.255 However, BP’s participation within unified 
command, consistent with ICS and the National Contingency Plan, un-
derstandably raised many questions in the eyes of the public and political 
leaders.256 
Aside from the broader questions suggested above, the actual im-
plementation of ICS in the Deepwater Horizon response exhibited famil-
iar challenges seen with prior disasters. These included (1) a lack of ap-
propriately trained ICS personnel and (2) difficulties with assigning 
trained personnel to appropriate ICS positions.257 Nevertheless, for all the 
challenges with training and chafing over federal control, after the 
Macondo well was finally capped and the post-mortems began, the 
common view seemed to be that the ICS framework for the Deepwater 
Horizon response worked fairly as intended.258 For the Enbridge spill 
near Marshall, Michigan, happening in the same summer of 2010, re-
                                                 
 253. Id. at 139. 
 254. See sources cited supra note 134; see also Clean Water Act § 311(c)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321(c)(3)(A) (2010) (“Each Federal agency, State, owner or operator, or other person participat-
ing in efforts under [Clean Water Act Section 311] shall act in accordance with the National Contin-
gency Plan. . . .”). As a rule promulgated by an agency pursuant to an express grant of statutory 
authority, the National Contingency Plan may be considered a particular species of regulation known 
as a “legislative rule,” carrying a binding force of law. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7:9–7:14 (2d ed. 1978). 
 255. As BP explicitly acknowledged in its “lessons learned” report, “The entire spill response 
has been and will continue to be conducted under the Unified Command structure, in which ultimate 
authority resides in the United States Coast Guard.” BRITISH PETROLEUM, DEEPWATER HORIZON 
CONTAINMENT AND RESPONSE: HARNESSING CAPABILITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED (2010), availa-
ble at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGI
NG/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Containment_Response.pdf. 
 256. One legal commentator observed, “That the responsible party is both an adversary and a 
partner may be confusing to the general public but is a direct result of the incongruent obligations 
imposed by [the Oil Pollution Act].” Griggs, supra note 20, at 60. 
 257. For one frank, inside perspective on the ICS operation for the Deepwater Horizon re-
sponse, see Epperson, supra note 227. 
 258. See, e.g., U.S. COAST GUARD, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: INCIDENT SPECIFIC 
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) FINAL REPORT 74 (2011) (“NIMS/ICS generally worked well for 
this incident.”); Griggs, supra note 20, at 79 (“The existing regulatory structure appears for the most 
part to have functioned as it was intended.”). 
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sponders seemed to share this same assessment that ICS worked effec-
tively.259 
E. ICS Applications Today 
 As the Deepwater Commission suggested, federal and state 
agencies have recently made efforts to establish liaisons between unified 
command and local communities, and they have added local officials to 
the federal and state officials directing operations through unified com-
mand. For example, in June 2011, the U.S. Coast Guard and the State of 
Washington included local officials in a full-scale exercise260 simulating 
response to a major oil spill in Puget Sound.261 Consistent with recom-
mendations from both ICS practitioners and scholars, the Salish Sea ex-
ercise allowed participants to practice their ICS roles and helped instill a 
sense of “response community” among federal, state, and local respond-
ers in the Puget Sound area. Responding pointedly to concerns expressed 
by some ICS critics,262 the exercise also included simulation of coordi-
nated support from volunteers.263 
Of course, there are costs associated with inclusivity. More than a 
decade ago, social scientists and ICS practitioners recorded concerns 
with “mobilization overkill,” when field operations became congested 
with bodies seemingly present merely to fill out organizational charts.264 
Excessive elaboration of organizational structures may also create more 
opportunities for misplacing people within the organization. Experience 
with the Deepwater Horizon response, as one Coast Guard evaluator ob-
served, demonstrated “how critical the correct use of our members in the 
                                                 
 259. “For [EPA] Region 5, this is one of our first big incidents utilizing the Incident Command 
System. It’s working very well.” Enbridge Response, supra note 5 (statement of Steve Renninger, 
EPA Region 5 Planning Section Chief). 
 260. Such drills are specifically authorized by Congress, pursuant to Section 311 of the Clean 
Water Act, and suggested to include “participation by Federal, State, and local agencies” as well as 
private industry and responsible parties. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(7) (2010). 
 261. The US-CAN Salish Sea 2011 exercise included more than 200 participants from the 
Coast Guard, EPA, Navy, the Washington Department of Ecology, county governments, and other 
federal, state, and local agencies, as well as Canadian counterparts. Spill Exercise US-CAN Salish 
Sea 2011 Conducted at NAS Whidbey Island, NAVY.MIL (June 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=61220&VIRIN=&imagetype=0&page=1. 
 262. See sources cited supra notes 102 & 129 and accompanying text. 
 263. See WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, US-CAN Full Scale Exercise 2011, 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/incidents/US-CAN_SalishSeaFullScaleExercise2011/US-
CAN_SalishSeaFullScaleExercise2011.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (noting bold advisement 
that “THIS IS A DRILL”). 
 264. See Bigley & Roberts, supra note 104, at 1287 (illustrating concerns from battalion 
chief’s comments about too many bodies filling boxes and “nobody left to put out the fire”). 
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right positions is to the success of the operation.”265 Most recently, Pro-
fessor Gregg Macey, applying organization theory to the Deepwater 
Horizon response, described a “paradox of organizing”: while we rely 
upon organizations to prevent and respond to crises, organizations may 
themselves contribute to the cause or exacerbation of those crises.266 As 
prior studies have hinted, 267 the paradox of organizing may never admit 
of any simple solutions, although it may benefit from future research by 
practitioners, policymakers, and academics.268 
Any organizational construct will have its upsides and down-
sides.269 But ICS has evolved over decades of experience, learned from 
successes and failures, and emerged as the standard for incident man-
agement in the United States. Today, beyond simply a measure promoted 
by federal purse strings,270 ICS is now the law far and wide, mandated by 
state statutes271 and regulations,272 as well as regional compacts,273 local 
                                                 
 265. Epperson, supra note 227, at 5. Epperson proceeds to emphasize that this systemic prob-
lem is not one likely to be resolved through additional ICS training. Epperson notes, however, that 
many fear such additional training will be the “likely reaction for States, local, and industry,” recog-
nizing that “it is much easier to blame training” than to alter fundamental organizational structures. 
Id. 
 266. Macey, supra note 44, at 2068–72. 
 267. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 49, at 225 (noting there are “no easy answers” to questions of 
how to improve or even distinguish among ICS problems of system, implementation, and context). 
 268. Macey, supra note 44, at 2111 (“Future commissions, those who develop emergency 
management systems, and legal scholars should consider how this paradox could be better man-
aged.”). 
 269. As Cole in his 2000 evaluation of ICS pragmatically acknowledged, “there may be an 
unavoidable price to pay in the form of additional complications and workload” whenever expanding 
an organization’s structure and mission in order to satisfy external demands. COLE, supra note 49, at 
220–21. 
 270. See sources cited supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing HSPD-5). 
 271. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 26.23.077(a)–(b) (stating local, inter-jurisdictional, regional, 
and state emergency plans shall include “an incident command system that describes the respective 
roles of affected persons and agencies”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8670.29 (“[O]il spill contingency plan 
shall . . . provide for the use of an incident command system to be used during a spill.”); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 8588.12 (stating the terrorism awareness curriculum shall include understanding “the struc-
ture and function of an incident command system”); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-57 (stating the Georgia 
Emergency Management Agency “shall establish and maintain . . . a standardized, verifiable, per-
formance based unified incident command system”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-928(o) (stating the state 
division of emergency management shall “implement the use of an incident management system 
during emergency and disaster situations by all state, county, city and interjurisdictional disaster 
agencies which respond to such emergency and disaster situations”); WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.030 
(stating the state director must develop comprehensive, all-hazard emergency plan which “must 
specify the use of the incident command system for multiagency/multijurisdiction operations”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.963 (stating the regional fire service plans “shall be consistent with the 
incident command system”); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.974 (stating the mobilization of regional 
law enforcement “shall be consistent with the incident command system”). 
 272. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 19, § 2405(a) (“Emergency response agencies operating at 
the field response level of an incident shall utilize the Incident Command System, incorporating the 
functions, principles and components of ICS.”); CAL. RULES OF CT. § 10.172(b)(1)(C) (“Each court 
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ordinances,274 and executive orders.275 As such, ICS must be understood 
by those who would engage in it, as well as those lawyers and legal 
scholars who would competently advise clients and policymakers on how 
it should be considered, applied, or changed. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM 
“[T]he law and lawyers must support . . .  
operations in new ways. . . .”276 
 
In late July 2010, as unified command on the Gulf Coast was still 
struggling to seal the cap on the Macondo well, the Enbridge oil spill 
occurred near Marshall, Michigan. As with the Deepwater Horizon re-
sponse, the Enbridge spill required a massive mobilization of personnel 
and resources from all levels of government, as well as the responsible 
party, working together through unified command.277 Within six months, 
yet another oil spill—one of minimal volume, but with potentially grave 
environmental and economic implications278—occurred in the middle of 
                                                                                                             
security plan must . . . address the following general security subject areas . . . Incident command 
system.”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 6041(C) (stating ambulance services must have a disaster plan 
that “shall include an incident command system that is compliant with [NIMS]”); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 58, § 155.7(e)(2)(v) (stating school emergency response plan “shall include . . 
. definition of the chain of command in a manner consistent with the National Incident Management 
System / Incident Command System”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-824-50010 (stating businesses 
must ensure protection of employees from releases of hazardous substance by making sure that “a 
single individual, acting as the incident commander (IC), is in charge of the site-specific incident 
command system”). 
 273. See, e.g., NORTHERN VIRGINIA EMERGENCY SERVICES MUTUAL RESPONSE AGREEMENT 
5 (2009), available at 
http://www.novaregion.org/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1682 (requiring that all tactical unit and 
personnel responding to requests for mutual aid “shall operate in a manner in accordance with the 
NIMS Incident Command System”). 
 274. See, e.g., King Cnty., Wash., Ordinance 15,114 (Feb. 1, 2005) (“The National Incident 
Management System is hereby adopted.”). 
 275. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 26 § 5.26 (1996), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 
5.26 (“NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE E. PATAKI, Governor of the State of New York . . . do 
hereby establish the . . . Incident Command System as the State standard command and control sys-
tem during emergency operations.”). 
 276. FREDERIC L. BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT: ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY 
OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI 319 (2001) (paraphrasing Army General George Prugh, 
speaking in 1974 of the role of military lawyers in military operations). 
 277. See sources cited supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text. 
 278. Roughly 14% of the crude oil supply in the United States depends on transport by the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). Magill, supra note 37. Loss of this domestic supply reflected 
instantly in U.S. markets and beyond. See Trans Alaskan Pipeline Shuts Down, ECOWORLD (Jan. 12, 
2011), http://www.ecoworld.com/energy-fuels/oil-petroleum/trans-alaskan-pipeline-shuts-down-
after-spill.html (reporting the temporary shutdown of pipeline for repairs in January 2011 edged up 
oil prices worldwide). 
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winter on Alaska’s North Slope.279 Before 2011 was through, an EF5 
tornado tore through the heart of Joplin, Missouri,280 massive flooding 
struck the Midwest,281 the Southwest experienced record fires,282 an 
earthquake rattled the Washington Monument,283 and Hurricane Irene 
swept up the Atlantic seaboard, swelling rivers from Puerto Rico to 
Vermont.284 
The very next year, 2012, seemed determined to validate and even 
exceed climate change predictions by becoming the warmest year ever 
recorded in the United States.285 Along with this record heat, the United 
States experienced no less than eleven disasters in 2012 that each caused 
at least $1 billion in damages.286 Among these disasters was Hurricane 
Sandy, which made a direct hit on New York City, devastated swaths of 
                                                 
 279. TAPS Pump Station No. 1 oil spill was discovered by workers on the morning of January 
8, 2011, with oil collecting in the basement of a pump building at the head of the pipeline on Alas-
ka’s North Slope. Repair of the leak required shutting down the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 
stopping oil production on the North Slope of approximately 630,000 barrels per day. Restart of the 
pipeline raised grave concerns about the loss of pipeline integrity while the pipeline idled in the 
bitter Arctic temperatures. See Casey Grove, Leak at Pump Station Shuts Down Pipeline, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/01/08/1638862/pump-station-
leak-shuts-down-pipeline.html. 
 280. The Joplin tornado, on Sunday, May 22, 2011, with winds in excess of 200 miles per 
hour, claimed an estimated 157 lives, making it the single deadliest tornado since modern record-
keeping began in 1950. See Preliminary Tornado Statistics Including Records Set in 2011, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/ 
2011_tornado_information.html. 
 281. Flooding in 2011 struck the entire drainage of the Mississippi River, from North Dakota, 
through Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi, and Arkansas, to the Mississippi Delta, and east to western 
Kentucky and Tennessee. It was the largest flooding along the Mississippi in the past century, com-
parable to the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. See 2011 Mississippi River Floods, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Mississippi_River_floods (last modified Apr. 22, 2013). 
 282. In 2011, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas all experienced record fire seasons. Bob Chris-
tie, Officials: Southwest Fires Will Blaze Until July Rains, USA TODAY (July 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/wildfires/2011-06-22-arizona-southwest-wildfires-
forecast_n.htm. The record fires in New Mexico in 2011 were shortly passed by record fires in 2012. 
Michael Martinez, Biggest Wildfire in New Mexico’s History Burns with Only 15% Containment, 
CNN (June 2, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-02/us/us_new-mexico-historic-
wildfire_1_forest-service-fire-crews-fire-managers?_s=PM:US. 2012 also brought record fires in 
Colorado. See Jenny Deam & John M. Glionna, Three Major Fires Wreaking Havoc in Colorado, 
L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2012 (noting worst fire season in Colorado history, with Waldo Canyon Fire 
prompting evacuation of 32,000 people in Colorado Springs area and huge High Park Fire ranging 
uncontrolled near Ft. Collins). 
 283. See Joel Achenback, 5.8 Virginia Earthquake Shakes East Coast, Rattles Residents, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-23/local/35270585_1_vir 
ginia-earthquake-office-buildings-bill-line. 
 284. Crossroads of World Shuts Down and Waits, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at A1 (dis-
cussing eerie quiet in New York City after evacuations ordered in advance of Hurricane Irene). 
 285. See Justin Gillis, Not Even Close: 2012 Was Hottest Ever in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2013, at A1 (noting that 2012 not only shattered the previous record set in 1998, but also set 34,008 
daily high records across the United States). 
 286. Id. 
1898 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1855 
New York and New Jersey, and caused impacts from Jamaica to Toron-
to, and as far west as the Ohio Valley and Wisconsin.287 The destruction 
wrought by Sandy was staggering, second only to Katrina seven years 
earlier.288 In some ways, Sandy even exceeded Katrina. For example, in 
terms of size, the diameter of Sandy’s high winds reached more than 
twice that of Katrina.289 In terms of impacts, Sandy appears to have af-
fected far more people along the dense urban East Coast than Katrina 
affected along the relatively rural Gulf Coast. 290 And yet, while affecting 
more people, Sandy resulted in far fewer deaths.291 While that difference 
may be explained by many factors,292 part of it may have been the nota-
ble improvements in disaster response over the last seven years,293 with 
some improvement following from changes in disaster law itself. 
As Katrina inspired the Post-Katrina Act,294 Sandy likewise in-
spired legislation with the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act signed into 
law on January 29, 2013.295 To assist effectively with disaster response, 
                                                 
 287. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE SANDY 15–19 (2013). 
 288. Damage estimates from Hurricane Sandy have ranged widely, up to $82 billion according 
to estimates put forward by state governors in seeking federal aid. Raymond Hernandez, Congress 
Approves $51 Billion in Aid for Hurricane Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at A21. More modest 
estimates put the damage estimates from Sandy on the order of $50 billion, still a staggering sum. 
BLAKE, supra note 287, at 15. For comparison, Hurricane Katrina was estimated to have resulted in 
$148 billion in costs, in 2012 dollars. Andy Newman, Hurricane Sandy vs. Hurricane Katrina, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at A28. 
 289. The diameter of Katrina’s high winds was approximately 400 miles, while the diameter of 
Sandy was 940 miles. Hurricane Irene, the year before Sandy, also exceeded Katrina, with a diame-
ter of 520 miles. Mark Fischetti, Sandy Versus Katrina, and Irene: Monster Hurricanes by the Num-
bers, SCI. AM., Nov. 7, 2012. 
 290. As one measure of Sandy’s impact, approximately 8.5 million homes lost power as a 
result of Sandy, compared to approximately 3 million homes due to Katrina. Newman, supra note 
288. 
 291. Official estimates report that Sandy resulted in at least 147 direct deaths. BLAKE, supra 
note 287, at 1. This is more than ten times less than the approximately 1,836 lives lost due to Katri-
na. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 292. See generally VERCHICK, supra note 171, at ch. 6 (introducing concept of “Disaster Jus-
tice,” concerning the disproportionate impacts of disasters on vulnerable groups, including people of 
color, the poor, women, and the elderly). 
 293. In striking contrast with the infamously anemic government response to Hurricane Katri-
na, the response to Sandy received broad—even bipartisan—praise. See, e.g., Steve Vogel, Officials 
and Experts Praising FEMA for its Response to Hurricane Sandy, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2012 (quot-
ing Republican New Jersey Governor Chris Christie as stating, “The president has been outstanding 
in this and so have the folks at FEMA.”); see also Daniel Wolff, The Debt We Owe Katrina, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012. 
 294. See Post-Katrina Act, supra note 189. 
 295. Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, § 1101, 127 Stat. 4 (2012). 
For a summary of changes effected by this legislation, see FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FACT 
SHEET: SANDY RECOVERY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2013 (2013), http://www.fema/gov/library/ 
viewrecord/do?id=6983. Among other significant changes, the legislation amended the Stafford Act 
to allow recognized tribes to make requests for federal disaster assistance directly to the President, 
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lawyers and legal scholars must stay abreast of relevant, and sometimes 
rapid, developments in the law. However, they will also need to be pre-
pared to address a rapid-fire series of wide-ranging legal questions that 
may arise early in any disaster. Consider just a few of the legal questions 
raised in the early days of the Katrina response: Can FEMA initiate a 
response without a request from the governor?296 If a responding agency 
deploys personnel who have not had proper immunizations, can the 
agency be held liable?297 Can evacuees bring their family dog to the shel-
ter?298 Can an undocumented worker who lost his home to the hurricane 
seek emergency shelter from FEMA?299 What are the specific require-
                                                                                                             
instead of requiring that such requests be routed through the governor of a state. For analysis of that 
long-standing controversy, and the recent legislative response, see Heidi K. Adams, Sovereignty, 
Safety, and Security: Tribal Governments Under the Stafford and Homeland Security Acts, 1 AM. 
INDIAN L.J. 127 (2012); Heidi K. Adams, Sovereignty, Safety, and Sandy: Tribal Governments Gain 
(Some) Equal Standing Under the Hurricane Sandy Relief Act, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 376 (2013). 
 296. At the time Katrina hit, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel had re-
portedly determined that the federal government had authority to respond even over the objection of 
local officials. See Ryan, supra note 206, at 529. This position is apparently consistent with the long-
held (but little exercised) view of FEMA. FARBER ET AL., supra note 16, at 98. Upon review, the 
House criticized FEMA’s reliance on a “pull” system of waiting for requests to deploy assets rather 
than utilizing a “push” system to deploy assets based upon need rather than just request. A FAILURE 
OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 136–37. To clarify FEMA’s authority to respond without a specific 
state request, Congress amended the Stafford Act to add Section 402(5), which provides that, in any 
major disaster, the President may “provide accelerated Federal Assistance and Federal support where 
necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage, which may be provided 
in the absence of a specific request.” 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(5) (2010). 
 297. With respect to federal employees, see Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
8101–8152 (2005). In general, with specified exceptions, “The United States shall pay compensation 
. . . for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the 
performance of his duty.” 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). 
 298. At the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, with a population of 500,000, as many as 
69% of the people were pet owners. By some estimates, as many as 600,000 pets and animals were 
affected by the hurricane. Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act of 2005, 151 
CONG. REC. E1943 (2005) (introduced) (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). Many people reportedly 
risked their lives to save their pets, among other things by refusing to board evacuation buses with-
out their pets. See Casey Chapman, Not Your Coffee Table: An Evaluation of Companion Animals as 
Personal Property, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 187, 205–06 (2009). For a compelling documentary on the 
impacts of Hurricane Katrina on pets and prolonged efforts to return them to rightful owners, see 
MINE (filmmovement 2009). In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Pet Evacuation and 
Transportation Standards (PETS) Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-38, 119 Stat. 408 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5196b(g) (2008)), requiring that state and local preparedness plans “take into account the 
needs of individuals with household pets and service animals prior to, during, and following a major 
disaster or emergency.” 
 299. Among the massive devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina were severe impacts on 
immigrant communities. By one estimate, the flood following Hurricane Katrina displaced nearly 
40,000 Mexican citizens living in the New Orleans area. VERCHICK, supra note 171, at 141. U.S. 
law generally bars non-citizens from receiving federal assistance. Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1611(a)–(c)). However, it allows an exception for “short-term, non-cash, in-kind disaster relief.” 
Id. § 1611(b)(1)(B). Reflecting that exception, FEMA issued a public notice stating, “Regardless of 
1900 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1855 
ments for providing reimbursement to states contributing mutual aid?300 
What are the requirements for out-of-state healthcare professionals to 
practice in states where they are not licensed?301 Can contaminated 
floodwaters from New Orleans be pumped into Lake Pontchartrain with-
out a discharge permit?302 For purposes of removing hurricane debris 
from private property, consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the 
Stafford Act,303 how can government agencies obtain access to private 
properties when the owners cannot be identified or located?304 Do re-
                                                                                                             
immigration status, all individuals impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are eligible for non-cash 
emergency food, water, medical care, shelter, clothing, and other urgent disaster-related needs from 
FEMA.” FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DISASTER ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FOR NON-
CITIZENS (2005). For a thorough analysis of the rights and limitations of immigrants receiving assis-
tance in response to a major disaster or declared emergency, see Ashley Morey, No Shelter from the 
Storm: Undocumented Populations and Federal Disaster Aid, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257 (2012). 
 300. Mutual aid in response to Hurricane Katrina included deployment of more than 67,891 
personnel from forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. A 
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 184, at 144–45. State officials from Louisiana and Mississippi 
viewed the response as successful. Id. For an excellent introduction to the mutual aid framework and 
requirements, see Alan D. Cohn, Mutual Aid: Intergovernmental Agreements for Emergency Pre-
paredness and Response, 37 URB. LAW. 1 (2005). 
 301. Telephone interview with Catherine Bernstein, Acting Chief Counsel, Cal. Emergency 
Mgmt. Agency (July 13, 2012) [hereinafter Bernstein Interview]. In general, the Emergency Man-
agement Assistance Compact, established pursuant to federal statute, Pub. L. No. 104-321 (1996), 
provides, “Whenever any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any state party 
to the compact evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills, 
and when such assistance is requested by the receiving party state, such person shall be deemed 
licensed, certified, or permitted by the state requesting assistance . . . subject to such limitations and 
conditions as the Governor of the requesting state may prescribe . . . .” Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, art. V. 
 302. Under the Clean Water Act § 311(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1321, and implementing regulations in 
the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, discharges that are in compliance with directions 
from an EPA on-scene coordinator do not require a permit. See Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Fre-
quent Questions, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/katrina/ 
faqs.htm#Floodi. 
 303. Under Stafford Act § 407, no removal of debris is authorized for federal funding “unless 
the affected State or local government shall first arrange an unconditional authorization for removal 
of such debris or wreckage from public and private property.” 42 U.S.C. § 5173(b) (2006). 
 304. To allow hurricane debris removal to proceed, state and local governments sought to 
obtain access by signed consent from the property owners whenever practicable. See, e.g., CITY OF 
GULFPORT, MISS., RIGHT OF ENTRY AGREEMENT (on file with author). When consent proved im-
practicable or impossible, state and local governments obtained legal authority by other means, 
including invocation of state emergency powers and placement of public notices on television and in 
print media prior to commencing debris removal and or demolition. See, e.g., Letter from Harry P. 
Hewes, City Attorney, Gulfport, Miss., to William L. Carwille III, Fed. Coordinating Officer, Fed. 
Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Sept. 20, 2005) (on file with author). Pursuant to such approvals, in 
response to the vast damage from Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. EPA coordinated the collection of 
“white goods” including some 380,000 abandoned refrigerators, freezers, and air conditioners that 
could contain refrigerants potentially harmful to the environment. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-07-651, HURRICANE KATRINA: EPA’S CURRENT AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION EFFORTS COULD BE ENHANCED BY ADDRESSING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACED ON 
THE GULF COAST 4 (2007). 
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quirements for conducting an environmental impact statement under the 
National Environmental Policy Act apply to siting new disposal facilities 
for the mountains of debris left by the hurricane?305 
The stream of legal issues left in the wake of a disaster raises one 
more obvious question: Where are the lawyers? The legal literature on 
this question has been rather sparse so far, although given the major 
events of the past decade, it appears to be growing.306 This Part will 
begin to formulate answers or at least suggestions for where the lawyers 
are, or where they might go, in order to (1) support clients who integrate 
within an ICS structure, or (2) support the response directly by integrat-
ing into the ICS structure themselves. Where lawyers integrate directly 
into ICS, this Part will examine the various roles lawyers may serve 
within the ICS organization, including the emerging role of the ICS legal 
officer. 
A. The Office 
The most likely place that lawyers will support their clients during 
an ICS activation will be wherever those lawyers support their clients 
ordinarily, namely, their usual legal office.307 Staying put, as it were, has 
many advantages: saving the time and costs of travel; reducing the logis-
tical pressures of providing additional workspace, meals, and lodging to 
another body at an incident scene; and avoiding concerns about “mobili-
zation over-kill” and overcrowding in an incident command post. Per-
haps most important, staying put will ensure the lawyer has the resources 
(including phones, computers, Internet access, and administrative sup-
                                                 
 305. See generally Stafford Act § 316, 42 U.S.C. § 5159 (2012) (providing that NEPA envi-
ronmental impact procedures are generally inapplicable to federal actions taken or funded in re-
sponse to a major disaster or emergency for the specific purpose of “restoring a facility substantially 
to its condition prior to the disaster or emergency”). 
 306. See, e.g., OTTO J. HETZEL & ERNEST B. ABBOTT, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2d ed. 2010); 
Joseph G. Jarret & Michele L. Lieberman, “When the Wind Blows”: The Role of the Local Govern-
ment Attorney Before, During, and in the Aftermath of a Disaster, 36 STETSON L. REV. 293 (2007); 
Nicholson, supra note 17, at 346. 
 307. Of course, legal offices themselves can be impacted by disasters and other incidents. See, 
e.g., G.M. Filisko, What Did Katrina Teach Us?, ABA J., July 2011, at 33 (noting that almost 9,000 
Louisiana lawyers were evacuated for a month or more as a result of Hurricane Katrina, and that 
many lawyers lost both their offices and their homes). As a result of the Katrina experience, the 
American Bar Association has encouraged law firms to adopt preparedness measures to ensure the 
protection of assets for both the firm and its clients. See, e.g., ABA COMMITTEE ON DISASTER 
RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS, SURVIVING A DISASTER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DISASTER 
PLANNING (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/disaster/sur 
viving_a_disaster_a_lawyers_guide_to_disaster_planning.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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port) that lawyers often need in order to provide clients with quality legal 
support.308 
Lawyers provide legal support to remote clients every day, assisted 
by advances in information technology and collaboration tools.309 In the 
ICS context, remote legal assistance may sometimes work well.310 How-
ever, when interacting with clients integrated within an ICS structure, a 
lawyer should understand at least the basics of ICS doctrine. For in-
stance, once integrated within an ICS structure, the client may have a 
new position title such as Operations Section Chief or Environmental 
Unit Leader. Moreover, consistent with the ICS principle of unity of 
command,311 the client integrated within an ICS organization may have a 
new ICS supervisor. This means that a client’s responsibilities and su-
pervisor within the ICS context may differ from that individual’s usual 
assigned duties and supervisor. The reality and significance of these dif-
ferent demands and relationships facing a client in ICS may be difficult 
for a lawyer to appreciate remotely, particularly for a lawyer with no 
concept of ICS doctrine. 
But even if the remote lawyer is able to comprehend the client’s 
different work environment, there are still particular challenges for law-
yers who attempt to serve ICS clients remotely from the relative comfort 
of their usual offices. For one thing, it may be difficult or impossible for 
a lawyer to reach a client who is at the scene of a disaster, with commu-
nications channels impaired by power outages,312 downed phone lines, 
and remote areas that lie beyond reach of cell signals or Internet ser-
vice.313 Moreover, even where communications are working fully, re-
sponders may not have the time or patience to keep their lawyers posted 
                                                 
 308. By contrast, one trio of FEMA field counsel supporting the Hurricane Katrina response 
had to share a data cable in their first week, allowing each lawyer only twenty minutes of email and 
Internet access each hour. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DISASTER OPERATIONS LEGAL 
REFERENCE A-28 (2011) [hereinafter DOLR]. 
 309. See, e.g., Marc Lauritsen, Dancing in the Cloud, LAW PRAC. TODAY (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_today_home/law_practice_today_archive/de
cember11/dancing-in-the-cloud.html (discussing cloud-based information tools for attorney–client 
collaboration and document production). 
 310. Interview with Leif Palmer, Assoc. Reg’l Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 4 (Mar. 
16, 2012) (stating the incident commander “is not shy about calling me” from the command post, 
whenever he needs legal assistance); Telephone Interview with Bruce Jones, Assoc. Reg’l Counsel, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 6 (Mar. 12, 2012) (stating a senior EPA official sent to the field during 
Hurricane Katrina response “reached back” to EPA attorney for legal advice). 
 311. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Jarret & Lieberman, supra note 306, at 312 (“[T]he power outages that accompany 
most disasters deny attorneys the use of electronic research, the ability to confer with colleagues, 
access to computer databases, and the use of other helpful resources.”). 
 313. See Filisko, supra note 307 (“The system was challenged by the devastation to the 
infrastructure—no power, no cellphone signals, no working landlines.” (quoting Judge Madeleine 
M. Landrieu on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina)). 
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on changing site conditions. Distant lawyers may, in fact, discover that 
their clients in the field have been engaging in activities, such as negotia-
tions, that could have used legal assistance. As such, in order to better 
serve their clients, lawyers may consider leaving their offices and mov-
ing closer to the response activity. 
B. The Emergency Operations Center 
If not sitting in their usual offices, lawyers might step closer to the 
response activity by deploying to an emergency operations center 
(EOC).314 EOCs are facilities established by many federal, state, and lo-
cal agencies,315 as well as private organizations,316 ready to activate in the 
event of an incident. Specifically equipped for situational awareness and 
communications, EOCs assist coordination among field components and 
external parties by facilitating exchanges of information and movement 
of resources.317 Deployment to an EOC may mean a modest step, perhaps 
only moving to a different floor within the same building,318 or it may 
mean moving a little farther away, for instance, to a FEMA Regional 
Response Coordination Center.319 Either way, work in an EOC during a 
                                                 
 314. NIMS describes the “Emergency Operations Center” as a “physical location at which the 
coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) 
activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more 
central or permanently established facility.” NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 139. 
 315. Among federal agencies, the EPA maintains regional emergency operations centers co-
located with the ten EPA regional offices. Among the states, the California Emergency Management 
Agency, for example, maintains a state-of-the-art “State Operations Center” at its headquarters with-
in a 12.5-acre complex at the former Mather Air Force Base near Sacramento. See Operations Cen-
ter, CAL. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.calema.ca.gov/NewsandMedia/Pages/Oper 
ations-Center.aspx (last visited July 13, 2012). In 2009, the City of Los Angeles opened a new EOC 
on a ten-acre parcel in downtown Los Angeles, seismically isolated to withstand earthquakes and 
other threats. See Los Angeles EOC – 2009, DISPATCH MAG. ON-LINE, http://www.911dis 
patch.com/info/la_eoc/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
 316. In the Seattle area, for example, EOCs have been established by the Boeing Company and 
Seattle Children’s Hospital. See Katherine Beck, When Disaster Hits, BOEING FRONTIERS, May 
2011, at 36, available at http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2011/may/i_ssg02.pdf (Boe-
ing EOC in Renton, Washington); Interview by Jacob Hinton with Jeff Sconyers, Gen. Counsel, 
Seattle Children’s Hosp., in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 16, 2012). 
 317. See NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 66–67. Serving a coordination function, the term 
Emergency Operations Center may be somewhat of a misnomer, with actual operations managed in 
the field by the incident commander at the incident command post. Emphasizing the point, NIMS 
states plainly, “An EOC does not command the on-scene level of the incident.” Id. at 66. 
 318. For example, the Regional Emergency Operations Center for EPA Region 10 in Seattle is 
currently four floors away from the author’s EPA office. 
 319. Each of FEMA’s ten regions maintains a Regional Response Coordination Center 
(RRCC), which when activated may provide a base for federal response support and help coordinate 
with emergency operations centers for state and local governments and other response organizations. 
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 195, at 61. The RRCC for FEMA Region 10 is 
located in Bothell, Washington, a short distance outside of Seattle. 
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major incident may be intense, requiring some understanding of ICS and 
possibly specific training.320 
The EOC offers advantages to a lawyer that may not be available in 
the lawyer’s usual office. First, operating within an EOC may put the 
lawyer in direct contact with elected officials, senior managers, financial 
officers, and other key individuals responsible for helping to coordinate a 
response. Second, it may provide direct communications links to the in-
cident command post, other EOCs, and additional incident facilities and 
assets. Finally, it may also allow the lawyer to solely focus on legal sup-
port for the ICS activity, removing the lawyer from the daily distractions 
and competing demands of his usual work. For such reasons, some or-
ganizations practice and deploy legal counsel to their EOC when they are 
needed,321 consistent with longstanding guidance from FEMA.322 
C. The Incident Command Post 
Beyond the emergency operations center, it is possible—and per-
haps increasingly likely—that a lawyer supporting a major disaster or 
incident may be sent to “the field,”323 working out of a facility such as an 
                                                 
 320. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING 
PROGRAM 59 (2011) [hereinafter NIMS TRAINING PROGRAM] (“G-775: Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) Management and Operations”). 
 321. The California Emergency Management Agency, for example, has an “established posi-
tion” for legal counsel within its State Operations Center in the event of an activation and has, in 
fact, deployed attorneys there for training exercises and real incidents such as response to the 2011 
Japanese earthquake and tsunami. Bernstein Interview, supra note 300. The City of Seattle Law 
Department recently rotated some twenty city attorneys through its EOC during the 2012 Evergreen 
Earthquake exercise, and has developed a cadre of four legal “first responders” ready to deploy to 
the City EOC at any time. Interview with Bill McGillin, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Seattle, 
Wash. (July 5, 2012). For the same exercise, the Washington Attorney General’s Office placed one 
lawyer in the state EOC and had other state lawyers on-call for support. Telephone Interview with 
Joe Panesko, Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Wash. (July 6, 2012) [hereinafter Panesko Interview]. 
The Evergreen Earthquake exercise also involved coordination among six county EOCs within the 
Puget Sound area, plus dozens of other federal, state, tribal, and local agencies. See Evergreen 
Quake 2012 Exercise Series, WASH. MILITARY DEP’T EMERGENCY MGMT. DIV., 
http://www.emd.wa.gov/training/documents/EQESOverview04-18-12.pdf (last visited June 20, 
2012). 
 322. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, GUIDE FOR ALL-HAZARD EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
PLANNING, at 5-A-15 (1996) (“When notified of an emergency situation, [the Legal Department] 
sends a representative to the EOC, if appropriate.”). 
 323. Besides the incident command post, other “field” offices may include a joint field office 
(JFO), often established by federal agencies, including FEMA, to help coordinate federal, state, 
tribal, and local governments, along with private sector and nongovernmental organizations involved 
with supporting response and recovery efforts. See NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 
195, at 62–63. Like an emergency operations center, a joint field office does not manage on-scene 
operations but focuses instead on providing support to the on-scene operations. See NIMS 
DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 141 (defining “Joint Field Office”). Federal policy specifically con-
templates the deployment of legal counsel to a joint field office. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
JOINT FIELD OFFICE ACTIVATION AND OPERATIONS 16 (ver. 8.3 2006) (“The JFO Coordination Staff 
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incident command post. Only in the field may the lawyer fully grasp the 
situation and the response, an awareness attained by attending 6:00 a.m. 
shift briefings, sharing communal meals, and becoming attuned to battle 
rhythms. In so doing, the lawyer may discover problems that would nev-
er be reported back to the emergency operations center or senior leader-
ship. The lawyer will see difficult decisions made on the fly every day—
decisions that could benefit from legal advice—if only there was a law-
yer in the house. Of course, many responders will not welcome lawyers 
into the house, seeing them as more of a hindrance than help.324 To prove 
their worth, lawyers must arrive at a command post prepared to assist the 
response—not just with their legal knowledge and analytical skills—but 
also with an ability and willingness to provide good legal advice based 
upon limited information and deliberation.325 
Lawyers should also arrive in the field with some comprehension of 
the system within which they will be operating—that is, the Incident 
Command System. Ideally, any participants in an ICS structure will have 
proper training in ICS beforehand, including baseline ICS training at a 
minimum.326 Any person deployed to the incident command post should 
probably also have completed the ICS core curriculum327 plus position-
                                                                                                             
may include . . . representatives providing specialized assistance in the following areas: safety, legal 
counsel, equal rights, and security.”). Consistent with this policy, attorneys have in fact been de-
ployed to support activities within a joint field office. See, e.g., Bernstein Interview, supra note 301 
(California EMA attorney deployed to JFO in Pasadena to assist response to winter flooding in 
2010); Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Cox, Assistant Reg’l Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency Re-
gion 9 (June 25, 2012) [hereinafter Cox Interview] (EPA attorney deployed to FEMA JFO to support 
response to California wildfires in fall 2007). 
 324. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 17, at 361 (“Like many Americans, [responders] may 
dislike attorneys, regarding them as conceited and arrogant. Overall, many believe that attorneys are 
a hindrance rather than an asset, and do not regard legal counsel as an important part of the [re-
sponse] team.”). 
 325. As FEMA advises its own field counsel, “It is unlikely you will have the time and infor-
mation necessary to consider thoroughly all of the potential options and consequences associated 
with a particular decision in crisis operations.” DOLR, supra note 308, at A-44. However, in risk-
averse organizations, there may be a reputational trap whereby “legal actors that exercise discretion 
promptly seem impetuous and those that postpone action, awaiting more information, appear judi-
cious and prudent.” David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1466 (2011). 
Answering this concern, one commentator points out, “In fact, decision making is the law’s principal 
productive activity,” suggesting that exercises of discretion should be timed appropriately, respond-
ing to demand, in the same manner as other productive enterprises. Id. 
 326. Baseline training in ICS consists of ICS-100 and IS-700. NIMS TRAINING PROGRAM, 
supra note 320, at 11. ICS-100 is offered in several versions, including ICS for Health Care / Hospi-
tals (ICS-100.HC); ICS for Higher Education (ICS-100.HE); and ICS for Law Enforcement (ICS-
100.LE), id. at 65, all of which are available for completion online. For a full catalog of online ICS 
courses, see Independent Study Program, FEMA EMERGENCY MGMT. INST., 
www.training.fema.gov/IS (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
 327. The ICS core curriculum includes ICS-100; ICS-200, ICS-300, ICS-400, IS-700, and IS-
800. See NIMS TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 320, at 29. 
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specific coursework, as appropriate.328 Training requirements aside, law-
yers in the field should be ready to help in almost any way needed.329 
This Part will consider the major roles that lawyers may fill in the Inci-
dent Command System. 
1. Technical Specialist 
One place where ICS literature mentions lawyers specifically is 
within the planning section as a technical specialist.330 Among a diverse 
range of disciplines, technical specialists may include experts in explo-
sives, forensics, faith communities, toxicology, and law.331 Technical 
specialists are to be activated only as needed and could be assigned to a 
discrete “talent pool” within the ICS planning section or sent anywhere 
else they are needed within the ICS organization.332 
By working together within the planning section, technical special-
ists may benefit from interdisciplinary synergies,333 with their collective 
expertise and recommendations reflected in revisions to the incident ac-
tion plan. Alternatively, by serving in other units within the ICS organi-
zation, legal specialists may be in the best position to gather the facts 
about a particular legal issue and respond with timely legal advice. In the 
                                                 
 328. In the past, many of these training requirements may have been honored more in the 
breach by some organizations, although recent efforts have been made to scrutinize individual quali-
fications for “key leadership positions,” including incident commander, public information officer, 
and liaison officer. 
 329. Such assistance may actually be a matter of law. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3100 (“It 
is hereby declared that the protection of the . . . people of the state from the effects of natural, 
manmade, or war-caused emergencies which result in conditions of disaster . . . is of paramount state 
importance . . . . In furtherance of the exercise of the police power of the state in protection of its 
citizens and resources, all public employees are hereby declared to be disaster service workers sub-
ject to such disaster service activities as may be assigned to them by their superiors or by law.”); see 
also id. § 3101 (defining “disaster service worker” to include public employees of any county, city, 
and state agency—with no exception for public lawyers). Even where not required by law, many 
lawyers would certainly volunteer to help in any way, a practice that may be encouraged by their 
agency or organization. See, e.g., DOLR, supra note 308, at A-14 (advising FEMA field counsel, 
when arriving at an EOC or JFO, to “find ways you can help, even if it does not involve the practice 
of law”). 
 330. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 105. The title of “technical specialist” may be a bit 
misleading because it can encompass a broad array of disciplines, whether or not traditionally con-
sidered “technical.” 
 331. Id. NIMS does not suggest the need for “legal counsel” with expertise in any particular 
area of law, but presumably a particular lawyer would not be deployed as a technical specialist un-
less the lawyer’s specialty were well-known in advance. 
 332. Id. 
 333. For a recent argument in support of interdisciplinary collaborations involving lawyers, see 
Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone 
Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2798 (2012) (discussing recent scientific inquiries revealing that 
“most inventions . . . primarily result from fostering diverse connections among a broad spectrum of 
people and professions”). 
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context of an oil spill such as the Exxon Valdez or Deepwater Horizon, 
for example, a legal specialist might advise an operations section on how 
to carry out a dispersant application334 consistent with requirements of 
federal wildlife law.335 Similarly, one can imagine a legal specialist ad-
vising a finance section on the requirements of state law respecting mu-
tual aid agreements.336 
2. Liaison Officer 
 Higher up in the Incident Command System organization, a law-
yer may capably serve as the ICS liaison officer.337 A member of the ICS 
command staff, the liaison officer “is Incident Command’s point of con-
tact for representatives of other governmental departments and agencies, 
NGOs, and/or the private sector (with no jurisdiction or legal authority) 
to provide input on their organization’s policies, resource availability, 
and other incident-related matters.”338 In order to provide direct input to 
the liaison officer, agency representatives339 and personnel from NGOs 
and the private sector may be assigned to the liaison officer, forming a 
liaison office.340 
As with other command staff positions, appointment as a liaison of-
ficer presumes position-specific training341 and appropriate experience. It 
also appears to presume some ability to conduct legal analysis, as the 
liaison officer must engage in threshold questions as to which agencies 
or organizations have “jurisdiction or legal authority” to respond to an 
incident.342 Those that do have jurisdiction or legal authority to respond 
should participate directly in unified command. Those that do not, how-
                                                 
 334. For example, the EPA’s ICS handbook provides, “The Legal Specialist will act in an 
advisory capacity,” carrying out duties that may specifically include “[advising] on legal issues 
relating to the use of response technologies.” EPA ICS HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 9–12. 
 335. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2010); Marine Mammals 
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 336. See, e.g., Jarret & Lieberman, supra note 306, at 317–18 (discussing the law of Florida on 
mutual aid agreements). 
 337. See supra text accompanying note 82 (explaining the general functions of a liaison of-
ficer). 
 338. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 95. 
 339. “Agency representative” is another designated position within ICS, defined to mean, “[a] 
person assigned by a primary, assisting, or cooperating Federal, State, tribal, or local government 
agency, or nongovernmental or private organization, that has been delegated authority to make deci-
sions affecting that agency’s or organization’s participation in incident management activities fol-
lowing appropriate consultation with the leadership of that agency.” Id. at 135. The delegation of 
decision-making authority distinguishes an agency representative from other interested stakeholders. 
 340. Id. at 95. The liaison office is typically situated within the incident command post, near 
the incident commander or unified command and the public information office. 
 341. See NIMS TRAINING PROGRAM, supra note 320, at 46 (E/L 956: All-Hazards Position 
Specific Liaison Officer). 
 342. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
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ever, may still have a significant role or resource to contribute to the re-
sponse; as such, their involvement should be facilitated through the liai-
son officer.343 To determine how to involve the various agencies and or-
ganizations, the liaison officer must understand the overall incident ob-
jectives, the current needs to achieve those objectives, and the agencies 
or organizations that may have the resources to fill those needs.344 On the 
other hand, whether or not an agency or organization has resources to 
contribute, it may have a particular interest in the incident response. 
Most often, this would be the case where the agency or organization rep-
resents a community or region impacted or threatened by the incident 
and, as such, has a unique stake in the outcome.345 
To promote effective coordination with interested stakeholders and 
participating agencies, the liaison officer may invite them to send repre-
sentatives to the liaison office, organize and host public meetings, or 
send liaisons (true to the position title) to other locations, including other 
incident command posts and emergency operations centers. Liaison as-
signments to other locations may be particularly appropriate where rela-
tionships among organizations may be strained, or where incident im-
pacts may cross sovereign territories.346 Such assignments may require 
the exceptional communication and diplomatic talents often associated 
with lawyers.347 
Given the liaison officer’s diplomatic functions and coordination 
duties, combined with the need to comprehend the legal authorities and 
resources of other agencies and organizations, the liaison officer position 
in the Incident Command System has often been staffed by a lawyer. 
EPA lawyers, for example, have served liaison roles for the ICS respons-
                                                 
 343. On this point, recall Radvanovsky’s observation that one of the greatest strengths of ICS 
is its ability to expand or contract the ICS organization to “include other agencies and jurisdictions 
as needed.” RADVANOVSKY, supra note 26, at 110. 
 344. For example, if an incident may have an impact on cultural resources, the liaison officer 
may need to enlist the support of a state historic preservation office or a tribal historic preservation 
office, consistent with requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(a) et 
seq. (2012), and implementing regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 800.1–800.16 (2013). 
 345. Such agencies or organizations are generally recognized as “stakeholders.” ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM LIAISON OFFICER JOB AID (2009). 
 346. In the 2011 Salish Sea exercise, for example, which simulated an oil spill on Puget Sound 
threatening to enter Canadian waters, a liaison was detailed from the U.S. incident command post to 
the command post established by the Canadian government. 
 347. Throughout American history, from the Founding Fathers forward, lawyers have proven 
success as diplomats. See, e.g., WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE PARIS YEARS 
(1997) (noting Jefferson served as minister to France from 1784–1789); DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 
JOHN ADAMS (2001) (noting John Adams served as an American diplomat in Europe helping negoti-
ate a peace treaty with Great Britain, which was signed in 1782). Today, lawyers continue to fill key 
diplomatic posts, including the current U.S. Secretary of State (John Kerry, Boston College Law 
School), U.S. Ambassador to China (Gary Locke, Boston University School of Law), and the U.S. 
Ambassador to Canada (David Jacobson, Georgetown Law). 
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es to the Enbridge oil spill in Michigan,348 along with responses to Hurri-
cane Katrina,349 the Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay, 350 and 
the Salish Sea spill exercise in Puget Sound.351 For the Enbridge spill in 
particular, where agencies and contractor personnel descended upon 
Marshall, Michigan, to address the massive spill into the Kalamazoo 
River system, EPA’s Chicago region sent five EPA lawyers to serve as 
liaisons in two-week rotations.352 Reflecting on these experiences, law-
yers recognized the value their legal training brings to the liaison posi-
tion. Lawyers are “used to dealing with opposition and hostility,”353 and 
in the face of public pressures during a disaster response, liaison officers 
“must be comfortable, without getting confrontational,”354 remaining 
calm and focused on the mission objectives. 
Service as a liaison officer, however, may bring certain challenges 
for lawyers. First, lawyers serving as liaison officers must remember that 
legal privileges that would ordinarily apply in their legal practice may 
not apply when engaged in an ICS response. This point may be particu-
larly important to convey to others who may be used to working with a 
certain lawyer outside of the ICS context, where the attorney-client privi-
lege may be presumed. Second, lawyers serving as liaison officers must 
be careful to “stay in their lane,” focusing on their liaison duties, and not 
be tempted toward addressing legal issues. However, this focus may be 
difficult to maintain when other ICS participants discover “the lawyer in 
the house” and begin to bring that individual all manner of legal is-
sues.355 In such cases, the lawyer can still bring value to the liaison posi-
tion by identifying legal questions and then directing those questions to 
the proper attorneys.  
                                                 
 348. Telephone Interview with Thomas Krueger and John Breslin, Assistant Reg’l Counsel, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 5 (Mar. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Kruger & Breslin Interview]. 
 349. Interview with Wilda Cobb, Assistant Reg’l Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 4 (Mar. 
23, 2012).  
 350. Cox Interview, supra note 323. For background on the 2007 Cosco Busan spill, see supra 
note 127. 
 351. In the Salish Sea exercise, the author’s assigned role was liaison officer, although the 
assignment evolved somewhat during the period of play. See infra note 355 and accompanying text. 
 352. Krueger & Breslin Interview, supra note 348. Some lawyers also served more than one 
rotation. Id. 
 353. Telephone Interview with Connie Pulchalski, Assistant Reg’l Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agen-
cy Region 5 (Mar. 9, 2012). 
 354. Cox Interview, supra note 323. 
 355. Krueger & Breslin Interview, supra note 348. The author’s own experience in the Salish 
Sea exercise may be illustrative. When it became known to the incident commander and others that 
the author was the only lawyer among over 200 participants in the exercise, the author was quickly 
called upon by the incident commander to provide advice on a number of legal issues arising in the 
oil spill scenario. 
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3. Legal Officer 
 For legal practitioners and scholars, one signal development 
within the Incident Command System is a specific role on the command 
staff for lawyers: the legal officer. At this writing, the legal officer still 
seems to lack any explicit mention in the official literature of the Nation-
al Incident Management System, but authority for appointing a legal of-
ficer can be construed from the present text of NIMS. Beyond the liaison 
officer, safety officer, and public information officer, NIMS recognizes 
that “[a]dditional Command Staff positions may also be necessary,” de-
pending on the nature of the incident or “specific requirements estab-
lished by Incident Command.”356 NIMS specifically recognizes, for ex-
ample, that “a legal counsel may be assigned . . . directly to the Com-
mand Staff to advise Incident Command on legal matters.”357 When a 
position is created on the command staff, it carries the position title of 
“officer.”358 When a legal counselor assumes the title of officer, the re-
sult is a legal officer. Thus, depending on the nature of the incident and 
the demands of the incident commander, NIMS provides “a legal officer, 
or at least the potential for a legal officer, in every command post.”359 
Thus far, the authority to appoint a legal officer seems little used in 
ICS,360 but the concept of a legal officer has deep roots in American law. 
For perhaps a century in the corporate world, legal officers have been 
among the corporate officers providing senior leadership in U.S. compa-
nies.361 In the U.S. military, lawyers have served as military officers from 
                                                 
 356. NIMS DOCUMENT, supra note 22, at 95. 
 357. Id. As provided by NIMS, examples of “legal matters” justifying appointment of a legal 
officer specifically include “emergency proclamations, legality of evacuation orders, isolation and 
quarantine, and legal rights and restrictions pertaining to media access.” Id. The world of legal issues 
that may actually justify appointing a legal officer will, of course, be far greater. 
 358. Id. at 92 (Table B-1). 
 359. Telephone Interview with Matthew Bernard, FEMA Reg’l NIMS Coordinator (June 29, 
2012). 
 360. In the State of Washington, for example, this authority has been used “hardly ever” so far. 
Panesko Interview, supra note 321. 
 361. See, e.g., THOMAS CONYNGTON & R.J. BENNETT, CORPORATION PROCEDURE: A 
MANUAL FOR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, ATTORNEYS, AND ALL OTHERS CONCERNED WITH 
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 338 (1922) (noting by-laws of U.S. Steel Corporation that established 
the general counsel as the “chief consulting officer of the company in all legal matters”). More re-
cently, alongside the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and other corporate officers, 
corporations have begun to establish the position of Chief Legal Officer, a move that may connote 
both a broader portfolio among company affairs and elevated rank over the traditional general coun-
sel. See Rees Morrison, What’s the Difference Between General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer?, 
LEGAL DEP’T MGMT. (Mar. 22, 2006, 6:21 AM), http://lawdepartmentmanage 
ment.typepad.com/law_department_management/2006/03/whats_ the_diffe.html (“CLO also ele-
vates the legal leader to the so-called C-Suite, the titular peer of the Chief Financial Officer . . . , 
Chief Technology Officer . . . and others in the executive teepee.”). 
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the beginning of the republic, 362 commanding troops and even seeing the 
face of combat at times.363 Over the last half century, the role of legal 
officers in support of combat operations has evolved considerably, and 
today it may provide an instructive model for the increasing role of legal 
officers in support of ICS operations. Legal officers in the military have 
long been called upon to provide legal counsel for military members 
across the full spectrum of legal affairs, a general legal practice that con-
tinues today.364 Particularly since the Vietnam War, legal officers have 
also become increasingly engaged with direct support for military opera-
tions, contributing to the new legal discipline of “operational law.”365 
The practice of operational law would include many elements now 
familiar in the ICS context. These elements included recognition that 
lawyers “had to take their legal services to the field”366 and specifically 
“had to be located with commanders during a deployment.”367 In order to 
provide commanders with good advice, these lawyers had to be “opera-
tions smart,” able to understand both the mission objectives and the op-
erational system for meeting those objectives.368 Operational lawyers had 
                                                 
 362. Thomas Jefferson served with the rank of colonel during the Revolutionary War, a war 
that Jefferson personally helped to start by drafting of the Declaration of Independence. DUMAS 
MALONE, JEFFERSON, THE VIRGINIAN 140, 291 (1948). 
 363. During World War II, for example, Army lawyer Samuel Spitzer was awarded a Silver 
Star for a courageous act that resulted in the capture of more than 500 German soldiers. In the Kore-
an War, Army lawyer Bruce C. Babbitt took command of a rear perimeter defense after the front 
collapsed during a Chinese attack, and successfully repulsed the enemy attack. In later combat op-
erations, Army lawyers accompanied the first wave of U.S. troops on the October 25, 1983, assault 
on Grenada in Operation Urgent Fury and parachuted into combat in Panama in the 1989 Operation 
Just Cause. BORCH, supra note 276, at 62, 315, 321. 
 364. See U.S. ARMY CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, FORGED IN FIRE: LEGAL 
LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS 1994–2008 (2008) [hereinafter FORGED IN 
FIRE] (describing broad areas of judge advocate legal support including contracting, fiscal controls, 
environmental compliance, estate planning, landlord-tenant issues, vehicle repossessions, and disas-
ter relief, as well as Law of War, Rules of Engagement, Courts-Martial, and other areas more closely 
associated with military jurisprudence). 
 365. BORCH, supra note 276, at 313. Borch, in his analysis of military operations from Vi-
etnam (1959) to Haiti (1996), identifies four causes for this development: (1) the changing nature of 
warfare involving new technologies, humanitarian missions, and less-identifiable enemies; (2) the 
individual initiative of legal officers who were better educated, energetic, creative, and less fixed on 
traditional notions of lawyering; (3) new directives for ensuring military operations comply with the 
rule of law; and (4) the 1983 experience in Grenada, which resulted in institutional recognition of the 
need for field deployment of legal officers. See id. at 312–21. 
 366. Id. at 317. 
 367. Id. at 320–21. 
 368. Id. This point was also emphasized by one current military officer, who explained that the 
legal officer had to be in constant contact with the Commander in order to understand the Com-
mander’s goals and to provide the Commander with the best advice on how to meet those goals. 
Interview by Jacob Hinton with Treb Courie, Major, U.S. Army, in Fort Lewis, Wash. (Apr. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Courie Interview]. 
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to bring the requisite training,369 of course, including expertise in certain 
areas of practice, where needed.370 Operational lawyers had to provide 
legal support that was timely, accurate, and often creative.371 Finally, in 
support of mission objectives, lawyers on the front lines of operations 
had to be prepared to step out of traditional lawyer roles and serve other 
functions, such as a public affairs officer372 or liaison officer,373 as need-
ed. 
As a result of these demands upon their legal counsel and the ex-
panded roles their counsel served in military operations, commanders 
and missions reaped substantial rewards. In Panama, for example, mili-
tary lawyers addressed a problem of prolific firearms in the country by 
drafting a “guns-for-cash” policy, which resulted in the efficient removal 
of more than 8,000 weapons.374 Later, in Iraq, military lawyers helped 
navigate a complex body of customary and codified international law and 
military regulations to devise a program that would allow commanders to 
retain Iraqi currency captured by U.S. troops and apply such proceeds 
directly to humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.375 Considering all the 
successes of integrating lawyers into military operations, one military 
historian concluded that legal officers had become “a key member of the 
commander’s staff” and “more relevant and essential” to the military 
organization.376 Confirming this historical perspective, one current mili-
tary officer suggested that it was “more important than ever for Com-
manders in the field to have a legal advisor.”377 
                                                 
 369. Among training that operational lawyers may now receive is training in ICS in order to 
support domestic operations including responses to chemical, biological, or nuclear attack. Id. 
 370. For example, the need for additional military equipment and supplies in combat opera-
tions during Operation Desert Storm was noted to require the services of experts in contracts and 
fiscal law. BORCH, supra note 276, at 323. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 325 (army lawyer serving as “public affairs officer” in Haiti during Operation Up-
hold Democracy, 1994–1995). Civilian agencies have also recognized that lawyers can apply their 
polished speaking and writing skills within ICS public information offices. Cobb Interview, supra 
note 349 (in addition to serving as liaison officer on some incidents, EPA attorney Cobb also served 
in public information offices during ICS responses to Hurricane Katrina and the Columbia space 
shuttle disaster). 
 373. BORCH, supra note 276, at 313–14, 318 (noting that an Army lawyer, as “principal liaison 
officer,” engaged in diplomatic discussions with Viet Cong and South Vietnamese during Vietnam 
War); see also FORGED IN FIRE, supra note 364, at 367 (“Commands will often call upon [lawyers] 
to act as the command’s ‘professional liaison officer.’”). 
 374. BORCH, supra note 276, at 321. 
 375. FORGED IN FIRE, supra note 364, at 221–23. This program, known as the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program, involved the redistribution of more than one billion dollars of Iraqi 
currency, consistent with defined criteria, and supporting basic Iraqi needs such as healthcare, educa-
tion, irrigation, sanitation, vehicle repair, and the rule of law. Id. 
 376. BORCH, supra note 276, at 322. 
 377. Courie Interview, supra note 368. 
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Perhaps because of this military success with lawyers in combat 
operations, the military has appeared on the forefront of embracing the 
use of legal officers in Incident Command System operations.378 Among 
other applications, this policy appears in the area contingency plans379 
prepared by the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies consistent with the 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.380 
Extending this concept to an international level, the policy of including a 
legal officer on the ICS command staff has also been adopted in bilateral 
agreements between the United States and Canada for coordinating re-
sponses to oil and hazardous substance spills.381 Beyond just words and 
figures on paper, these plans have in fact been implemented in response 
to recent spills, including the Deepwater Horizon. 
For the Deepwater Horizon response, the Coast Guard established a 
legal office with six lawyers among the some 400 personnel deployed to 
Unified Area Command in New Orleans.382 Working sixteen-hour days, 
the lawyers in unified command wrestled with rapid-fire response issues 
such as the application of subsurface dispersants, compliance with the 
Endangered Species Act, transportation and disposal of solid wastes, re-
lations with state and local elected officials, marine safety, property 
management, records management, and any other legal issues that de-
manded their attention.383 In addition to Coast Guard lawyers, there were 
lawyers within Unified Area Command representing other agencies and 
private organizations, including BP.384 There were also lawyers for vari-
ous agencies and organizations sprinkled throughout the Area Command, 
including the incident command posts in Houston, Houma, and Mobile. 
                                                 
 378. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES 
(DOD 3150.8-M), INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL APP. 1–4. The DoD procedures spe-
cifically identify the Legal Officer as a member of the Command Staff and define the Legal Of-
ficer’s responsibilities to include “providing legal advice to the DoD [incident commander] or [uni-
fied command] and the staff, as well as ensuring all plans . . . policies, and directives are consistent 
with military, and Federal, State, local, and tribal law.” The Legal Officer’s responsibilities also 
include ensuring that accurate records are properly maintained, working closely with the documenta-
tion unit of the planning section. Finally, in the context of nuclear weapons accidents, the DoD pro-
cedures provide that the Legal Officer “should be very familiar with CERCLA.” Id. at 4. 
 379. See, e.g., ALASKA REG’L RESPONSE TEAM, UNIFIED PLAN: THE ALASKA FEDERAL/STATE 
PREPAREDNESS PLAN FOR RESPONSE TO OIL AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DISCHARGES/RELEASES, 
at B-16, B-29 fig. 5 (2010) (including legal officer among command staff). 
 380. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the National Contingency Plan). 
 381. See CANUSWEST, REGIONAL ANNEX: CANADA—UNITED STATES JOINT INLAND 
POLLUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN 11 (1998) (“The IC’s Command Staff consists of a Safety Officer, 
a Liaison Officer, a Legal Officer and a Public Information Officer.”). 
 382. Interview with Mike Lodge, former U.S. Coast Guard Legal Officer (Mar. 16, 2012). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Telephone Interview with private attorney who wished to remain unnamed (May 25, 
2012). 
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Like the Coast Guard lawyers, BP lawyers supporting the 
Deepwater Horizon response had to grapple with rapid-fire demands in-
cluding reviewing draft documents, seeking regulatory approvals, and 
initiating funding mechanisms.385 BP lawyers also addressed issues in-
cluding labor, finance, real estate, and the Vessels of Opportunity pro-
gram.386 As a large corporation, BP had the benefit of experience from 
dealing, in its own way, with other major incidents, including 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina.387 For the Deepwater Horizon, BP also had the bene-
fit of a crisis management system modeled upon the Incident Command 
System.388 
Environmentalists and commentators may speculate endlessly about 
BP’s motives for participating as it did in the massive response to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster.389 However, given the scope of liability that 
this incident presented to the company, it is hard to imagine any rational 
chief executive who would not want the benefit of legal counsel engaged 
directly in looking after the company’s interests in the response. For 
many of the same reasons that the U.S. military discerned the need for 
lawyers in combat operations and the Coast Guard wrote legal officers 
into their contingency plans, the private sector could readily see the value 
of having lawyers in the field where decisions are being made that affect 
private interests.390 This same conclusion supporting the use of legal of-
ficers in ICS appears to have been reached as well by other companies,391 
civilian agencies,392 and even elements of the judiciary.393 
                                                 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. On the Vessels of Opportunity program, see FACTSHEET ON BP VESSELS OF 
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM (2010) [hereinafter FACTSHEET ON BP], available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGI
NG/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/factsheet_bp_vessels_of_opportunity_program.pdf (noting that at 
that time, around 3,000 local vessels were already participating in the program, contracted to help 
contain the oil spread through activities including skimming, tending, and maintaining boom, and 
transporting supplies, personnel, and wildlife as part of the response). 
 387. For example, on 9/11, BP had employees scattered around the world, and BP lawyers 
assisted with efforts to bring them home safely after the airlines shut down. Later, in response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, BP lawyers assisted efforts to help protect BP interests in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Telephone Interview with private attorney, supra note 384. 
 388. Id. (noting that the ICS structure for Deepwater Horizon was “not alien” to the company). 
 389. For a tour de force of speculation on this question, see William H. Rodgers Jr., Jason 
DeRosa & Sarah Reyneveld, Stranger Than Fiction: An “Inside” Look at Environmental Liability 
and Defense Strategy in the Deepwater Horizon Aftermath, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219 
(2011) (offering a tongue-in-cheek imaginative scenario of advice from BP’s in-house counsel on 
how the company should control costs by taking over and managing the entire Gulf oil spill response 
under the ICS structure of unified command). 
 390. Applying economic analysis to advocate a role for lawyers in disaster response, one 
commentator concluded that “postponed legal decisions often have considerably less value than a 
decision made earlier.” Super, supra note 325, at 1380. 
 391. The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, for example, deployed legal counsel to the inci-
dent command post established in response to the January 2011 oil leak at the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
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One federal agency with an established practice of deploying legal 
officers is FEMA, which over the last twenty years has developed a ca-
dre of field counsel ready to deploy and provide command staff with le-
gal advice whenever and wherever needed.394 Of course, on the front line 
of any major incident will be representatives of state, tribal, and local 
government, with local governments most often providing the first re-
sponders. Recognizing that “local government plays the vital first re-
sponse role with regard to disasters,” commentators have noted that local 
emergency managers “must have access to competent legal counsel on a 
continuing basis.”395 Ensuring the availability of legal counsel with com-
petence in disaster and emergency management is not easy on any level 
of government, but may pose particular issues for the many communities 
that do not have full-time legal staff.396 
One significant challenge now for lawyers of any stripe who may 
be called upon by an incident commander to serve as legal officers in an 
Incident Command System activation is to locate available training and 
resources that will help the lawyer prepare for this assignment. So far, 
neither FEMA nor any other agency or organization appears to offer ICS 
training specifically for legal officers.397 Such training should be devel-
                                                                                                             
System (TAPS) Pump Station No. 1 on Alaska’s North Slope. See ALYESKA PIPELINE SERV. CO., 
INCIDENT ACTION PLAN, ICS 207 ORG CHART (2011) (on file with author). 
 392. For the TAPS Pump Station No. 1 incident, the U.S. EPA deployed several personnel to 
the incident command post, including the author as legal officer. Id. 
 393. For example, in response to the Occupy Seattle protests in early 2012, the Western Dis-
trict of Washington developed “Operation Peace Keeper,” combining resources from local and fed-
eral law enforcement agencies and including an Assistant U.S. Attorney as a legal officer in the 
command structure. See INCIDENT ACTION PLAN, OPERATION PEACE KEEPER (2012) (on file with 
author). 
 394. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DISASTER OPERATIONS LEGAL REFERENCE 4–23 
(2011). In its literature, FEMA does not refer to its field counsel as “legal officers,” but they appear 
to serve the same functions. Formerly associated with the ICS planning section, they now serve 
primarily within the ICS command staff, advising the federal coordinating officers who often serve 
as incident commanders. Interview with Mary Ellen Martinet, Assoc. Chief Counsel, Fed. Emergen-
cy Mgmt. Agency Office of Chief Counsel (July 27, 2012). Core competencies for FEMA field 
counsel also explicitly include, “Understand, use, and comply with Incident Command System (ICS) 
concepts, principles, and process.” FEMA OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, DEPLOYABLE FIELD 
COUNSEL TRAINING CURRICULUM 62 (2012). 
 395. Nicholson, supra note 17, at 354. 
 396. See id. at 356. Iowa, for example, was reported to have fifty-seven communities repre-
sented by full-time legal staff and forty-two communities represented by part-time legal staff. Id. 
 397. FEMA has developed training courses for its own field counsel, which lawyers from other 
agencies may be able to attend. Bernstein Interview, supra note 301 (California EMA attorneys 
attending FEMA training). For fiscal year 2013, FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) 
course offerings include Introduction to FEMA Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) Field Operations – 
Response, Recovery, and OCC Cadre Deployment (E/L 711); and Advanced Field Attorney Training 
(E714). For the full course catalog, see Emergency Management Institute, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, http://training.fema.gov/emi (last updated Apr. 11, 2013). Beyond FEMA, individual 
efforts have also been made to provide such legal training, including a workshop, “The Law and 
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oped and included among FEMA’s “mobile training courses” offered 
regularly around the country and even internationally.398 For now, law-
yers who may be deployed in an ICS activation should avail themselves 
of other appropriate ICS courses, including quick baseline courses that 
are available online without charge.399 
Like the current training for legal officers, the literature for legal of-
ficers remains undeveloped. This Article may provide one starting point 
within legal scholarship.400 However, the need for a literature to help de-
fine the role of lawyers within ICS activations has been recently recog-
nized by significant publications from FEMA401 and others within the 
emergency management community.402 As incident commanders increas-
ingly recognize the value of legal officers on their command staff, the 
demand for guidance and training in these positions can be anticipated to 
grow as well. Moreover, as lawyers gain experience serving in other ICS 
positions, including as liaison officers and technical specialists, the cadre 
of field-tested lawyers will continue to grow, deepening the pool of legal 
talent available to serve all legal needs for any future ICS activation. 
                                                                                                             
Catastrophic Disasters: Legal Issues in the Aftermath,” offered in 2009 in conjunction with a meet-
ing of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and NEMA’s Legal Attorneys 
Committee. While the workshop attracted state attorneys, costs of registration and travel reportedly 
resulted in few local attorneys in attendance. Nicholson, supra note 17, at 365 n.101. 
 398. Unlike hundreds of courses on other subjects offered by FEMA across the country in 
fiscal year 2013, including twelve offerings of NIMS ICS All-Hazards Liaison Officer, only three 
courses for lawyers were offered in fiscal year 2013, and none were offered outside of Washington, 
D.C. See Resident Courses (On-Campus), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://training. 
fema.gov/emicourses (last updated Nov. 8, 2012). 
 399. See supra note 326 (ICS-100, IS-700 available online). 
 400. To the author’s knowledge, this Article is the first time the legal officer concept within 
ICS has been recognized within legal academic work. However, Professor Nicholson accurately 
identified the NIMS authority for a legal officer in his 2010 law review article. See Nicholson, supra 
note 17, at 350–51. 
 401. In November 2011, FEMA’s Office of Chief Counsel published Version 1.0 of the Disas-
ter Operations Legal Reference, a substantial volume collecting laws, regulations, guidance, and 
lessons learned from twenty years of experience with FEMA field counsel, while attempting to dis-
pel “urban myths” that have grown up around the same. It is intended to remain as a living docu-
ment, capturing future lessons and remaining current with new law and legal interpretations. FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DISASTER OPERATIONS LEGAL REFERENCE vii–viii (2011). 
 402. In 2011, the first known description of specific duties for an ICS legal officer appeared in 
publication. See TIM DEAL, CHUCK MILLS & MIKE DEAL, ALL HAZARD FIELD GUIDE: A 
RESPONDER’S HANDBOOK USING THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM’S INCIDENT 
COMMAND SYSTEM 7–12 (2011). According to this source, some of the major duties of an ICS legal 
officer may include the following: obtaining a briefing from the incident commander or unified 
command; assigning tasks and supervising legal staff; attending required meetings, prepared to dis-
cuss legal issues; providing legal advice to command and other ICS staff; reviewing agreements and 
contracts; ensuring documentation meets established requirements; helping resolve labor issues; 
responding to ethics issues; working with the liaison officer to help resolve interagency concerns; 
working with the finance section to help resolve contractor disputes; and reviewing all plans to en-
sure compliance with legal mandates. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While lawyers can make substantial contributions to Incident 
Command System responses, the expanding use of ICS also raises fun-
damental questions in diverse areas of law including legal ethics, torts, 
corporations, and employment law. As a matter of legal ethics, for exam-
ple, who is the “client” of an ICS legal officer?403 Is it simply the law-
yer’s usual client outside of the ICS response,404 or is it possibly the ICS 
incident commander or the ICS organization itself?405 As a matter of 
torts, can failure to implement ICS properly result in civil liability?406 As 
a matter of corporate law, what is the legal status of an ICS organization? 
Can it sue or be sued?407 As a matter of employment law, can personnel 
                                                 
 403. The answer to this single question obviously carries profound implications for compliance 
with numerous rules of professional conduct. The lawyer, for example, owes a client the duty of 
competent representation, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1.1, and must ordinarily abide by a 
client’s decisions, id. § 1.2(a). A lawyer must preserve client confidences, id. § 1.6, and must seek to 
avoid conflicts among clients, id. § 1.7. Perhaps most significant for lawyers deployed to the field, a 
lawyer, in representing a client, “shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with 
a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter,” unless certain circum-
stances apply. Id. § 4.2 
 404. Even without the overlay of ICS, the question of “Who is the client?” may prove con-
founding under ordinary circumstances. For government lawyers, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct offer little more than an intellectual shrug: “Defining precisely the identity of the client and 
prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government con-
text and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1.13, 
cmt. 9; see also William R. Dailey, Who Is the Attorney General’s Client?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1113 (2012) (positing that the client of the Attorney General “is the American people,” but recogniz-
ing that the interests of the American people require “mediation” through spokesmen including the 
President and Congressional acts). 
 405. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”). 
 406. See, e.g., Donna Prince L. v. Waters, 48 A.D.3d 1137, 1139, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 00879 
(2008) (“[ICS] may form the predicate for liability . . . because it ‘mandates a reasonably defined 
and precedentially developed standard of care.’”) (citations omitted). For background and analysis of 
this case, see Bradley M. Pinsky, NIMS Directives and Liability, FIRE ENGINEERING, Mar. 2009; see 
also Cohn, supra note 300, at 17 (discussing cases including Buttram v. United States, where two 
volunteer firefighters died while fighting a fire in an ICS activation commanded by U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management); Buttram v. United States, Civ. Case No. 9609234-S-BLW (D. Idaho, Feb. 19, 
1999), available at http://www.idd.uscourts.gov/ECM/dc_images/_1DVOTAYE810007907.pdf 
(granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs against the United States). 
 407. Early cases on this question suggest the matter is far from decided. Two cases illustrate 
the irresolution of the law on this question. Brassinga v. City of Mountain View, 66 Cal. App. 4th 
195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), and Berger v. Mead, 338 N.W.2d 919 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), both in-
volved cases of city police officers injured while participating in training with regional SWAT 
teams. In Brassinga, the California court found that the regional tactical team, while employing a 
unified command structure, was not an entity that could qualify as an employer subject to suit or 
worker’s compensation claim. Brassinga, 66 Cal. App. 4th at 210–11. In Berger, the Michigan court 
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the tactical team was a “joint venture” under Michigan 
law. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that “[t]he key consideration is that the parties in-
tended a joint venture.” Berger, 338 N.W.2d at 922. For further analysis of these contrasting cases, 
see Cohn, supra note 300, at 48–50. 
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deployed to serve in an ICS response become the employee of the ICS 
organization?408 These and many other legal questions raised by ICS doc-
trine remain for lawyers, jurists, and legal scholars to consider and re-
solve. 
At the same time that lawyers begin to reflect systematically upon 
these questions raised by ICS, they may also become pulled into ICS 
themselves, either by supporting clients who deploy in ICS, or by de-
ploying directly. Early experience with lawyers in military combat and 
more recently in major incidents, such as the Deepwater Horizon and the 
Enbridge spill in Michigan, suggests that lawyers may bring significant 
value to field operations. However, before deploying to the field, or at-
tempting to assist clients who are deployed, lawyers should acquire some 
basic comprehension of ICS doctrine. 
Through tragic events including 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, we 
have seen the consequences of failure in command and coordination. 
More recently, however, we have seen the success that preparation and 
organization can bring, as with the timely response to Hurricane 
Sandy.409 Contributing to this success is the recent widespread adoption 
of the Incident Command System. Today, ICS has been embraced by 
federal agencies; by state, tribal, and local governments; and by the pri-
vate sector, schools, and nonprofit organizations. For lawyers, these enti-
ties represent a large number of clients, and these clients will need law-
yers who are both able and willing to provide timely and competent ad-
vice when disasters strike. Through training in ICS and critical analysis 
of questions raised by ICS doctrine, legal practitioners and scholars can 
be better prepared to serve their clients and the public interest when ur-
gent needs arise in our restless world and changing climate. 
 
                                                 
 408. At common law, an employer may “borrow” an employee from a primary employer for 
special purposes. The employee may then become a “special employee” of the special employer, 
with implications including worker’s compensation claims and potential tort liability for the special 
employer under the theory of respondeat superior. 30 C.J.S. Employer–Employee § 217 (2012). In 
the specific context of ICS, see Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352 (3rd Cir. 2003). Roma involved 
an application of ICS for coordinating a response by multiple fire companies to a major fire at a U.S. 
naval facility. Upon review, the appellate court found that a volunteer firefighter called to assist the 
Navy through a mutual aid agreement became a “paradigmatic example of a special employee.” Id. 
at 364. For a contrasting result, see Enslow Through Enslow v. United States, 1994 WL 649979 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (unpublished decision), where the appellate court found that a California state firefighter 
did not become a special employee of the U.S. Forest Service when called by the Forest Service to 
respond to a fire in a national forest. 
 409. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (noting the broad, bipartisan praise for the 
government’s response to Hurricane Sandy). 
